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CIVIL JURIES AND COMPLEX CASES: LET'S 
NOT RUSH TO JUDGMENT 
Richard 0. Lempert* 
I. AN EMPIRICAL PROBLEM 
The Supreme Court acted wisely when it denied certiorari in In 
re U.S. Financial Securities Litigation 1, forgoing, for the moment, the 
opportunity to decide whether the seventh amendment protects the 
right to jury trial in comp~ex civil cases. With the Third Circuit's 
decision in In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation ,2 
there is a clash between the circuits on this issue, and the Court may 
find the temptation to resolve the matter overwhelming. Yet the 
path of wisdom may well be to let the conflict continue or, if certio-
rari should be granted on this issue, to decide the matter in a way 
that invites future reconsideration. The issue of whether the seventh 
amendment right to jury trial remains inviolate in complex cases 
should be left open because we currently lack the information 
needed for an intelligent resolution. While hunches abound, we in 
fact know little about the likely answers to three crucial questions: 
(1) Are there cases so complex that juries cannot render verdicts 
fairly based upon a rational evaluation of the evidence? 
(2) If such complex cases exist, can judges sitting in lieu of ju-
ries render verdicts fairly based upon a rational evaluation of the 
evidence? 
(3) If such complex cases exist, is the jury's incapacity inherent 
when lay decision-makers confront voluminous evidence and com-
plex issues, or may it be avoided by changes in the trial process that 
do not undermine the essential characteristics of the civil jury? 
If the Court were to choose between the circuits today, it might 
well cloak its judgment in the language of historical scholarship or 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1964, Oberlin College; J.D. 1968, Ph.D. 
1971, University of Michigan. - Ed. 
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1. 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980) 
(holding that there is no complexity exception to the seventh amendment). 
2. 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that due process considerations mean that the 
seventh amendment does not necessarily mandate jury trials in complex civil suits). 
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doctrinal analysis,3 but it is likely that behind such language would 
lie judgments ab~ut the answers to one or more of these questions. 
The Justices' perceptions of the correct answers might differ dra-
matically, yet each of these questions is, in principle, empirical. 
They may all (again in principle) be answered by a combination of 
systematic observation, social experimentation, and generalization 
from a body of established social theory. To date, we have not ex-
ploited these sources of information, so debate about the right to jury 
trial in complex cases is informed more by intuitions and assump-
tions than by systematic knowledge. 
Judge Seitz's opinion in Japanese Electronic Products, holding 
that fifth amendment due process may justify a complexity exception 
to the seventh amendment, is instructive because it is a serious and 
thoughtful attempt to deal with this difficult problem. Seitz's discus-
sion of the jury's likely inability to deal with complex cases begins 
neither with the possibility that the jury will be overwhelmed by the 
volume of evidence nor with the complexity of the applicable legal 
standards. Instead, Seitz starts by discussing the burdens that a 
lengthy trial - however simple or complex the subject matter -. 
places on jurors: "The long time periods required for most complex 
cases are especially disabling for a jury. A long trial can interrupt 
the career and personal life of a jury member and thereby strain his 
commitment to the jury's task."4 The salute to the judge begins by 
sounding the same theme: "A long trial would not greatly disrupt 
3. There are a host of articles suggesting approaches that the Court might take. Some find 
an exception to the right to jury trial in complex cases and others do not. See, e.g., Arnold, A 
Historical Inquiry Into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. 
REV. 829 (1980); Campbell & Le Poidevin, Complex Cases and Jury Trials: A Reply to Profes-
sor Arnold, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 965 (1980); Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Prac-
tice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 43 (1980); Higginbotham, 
Continuing the Dialogue: Civ11 Juries and the Allocation of Judicial Power, 56 TEXAS L. REv. 47 
(1977); Jorde, The Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial of Antitrust Issues, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 
I (1981); Kane, Civil Jury Trial· The Case far Reasoned Iconoclasm, 28 IIAsTINGS L.J. 1 
(1976); Luneberg & Nordenberg, Specially Qual!fied Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Al-
ternatives for Coping With the Complexities of Modem Civil Litigation, 61 VA. L. REv. 887 
(1981); Oakes, The Right to Strike the Jury Trial Demand in Complex Litigation, 34 U. MIAMI 
L. REv. 243 (1980); Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial· A Study in the Irrationality 
of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U. L. RE.v. 486 (1975); Wolfram, The Constitutional His-
tory of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639 (1973); Note, U'!fit far Jury Determina-
tion: Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Right of Trial by Jury, 20 B.C. L. 
REv. 511 (1979) [hereinafter cited as U'!fitfar Jury Determination]; Note, The Right to a Jury 
Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92 HAR.v. L. REv. 898 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Harvard 
Note]; Note, Jury Trials in Complex Litigation, 53 ST. JoHN's L. RE.v. 751 (1979); Note, Pre-
serving the Right to Jury Trial in Complex Civil Cases, 32 STAN. L. REv. 99 (1979) [hereinafter 
cited as Preserving the Right]; Note, The Case for Special Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 89 
YALE. LJ. 1155 (1980). Cf. James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE. L.J. 655 
(1963). 
4. 631 F.2d at 1086. 
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the professional and personal life of a judge and should not be sig-
nificantly disabling."5 
The burdens of a lengthy trial are, of course, not unrelated to a 
fact-finder's ability to grapple with complexity.6 But the personal 
burdens that lengthy trials impose on jurors are so far from the core 
issue of competence that, as a matter of law, they may be as unper-
suasive on the constitutional issue as the burdens of military service 
are on the constitutionality of the draft. And to the extent that they 
are relevant, they invite actions that will alleviate the burdens of 
lengthy trials and not the abrogation of the right to jury trial. 
Why does Judge Seitz begin his analysis with what is legally a 
weak argument? I suspect it is because the empirical support for his 
position is soundest at this point. A jury is tremendously burdened 
by a trial of several months or more, while a judge may find it easier 
to handle one lengthy case than a number of shorter ones. When 
Seitz focuses directly on competence, the tone of his remarks 
changes. He notes, for example, that, "[t]he jury is likely to be unfa-
miliar with . . . the technical subject matter of a complex case. . . . 
The probability is not remote that a jury will become overwhelmed 
and confused by a mass of evidence and issues and will reach erro-
neous decisions."7 The italicized ''weasel words" indicate Seitz's 
proper reluctance to make empirical judgments on little evidence. 
Indeed, the only empirical evidence that he cites is one judge's obser-
vations concerning one case. 8 
The conclusion that a judge can competently hear complex cases 
does not even pretend to be empirical. After listing the potential 
advantages of judge over jury, Seitz writes, "the best course to follow 
is to presume the judge's ability to decide a complex case and to fo-
cus inquiry on the jury's ability."9 No citations to cases or the litera-
ture are offered in support of this presumption. 
Judge Seitz's reliance on impressions and presumption is under-
standable. Neither the social science community nor the legal pro-
fession has furnished the courts with the information needed for 
empirically grounded judgments about the capacity of juries to ra-
5. 631 F.2d at 1087. 
6. Judge Seitz argues, for example, that the prospect of a long trial may weed out the most 
able from the venire, and that a judge's greater ability to allocate time can help him to sur-
mount the difficulties of a complex suit. 
7. 631 F.2d at 1086 (emphasis added). 
8. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 
(N.D. Cal. 1978), q/fd per curiam, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980). But see Preserving the Right, 
supra note 3, at 114 n.78. 
9. 631 F.2d at 1087 (emphasis added). 
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tionally decide the issues posed by complex civil suits. Knowledge 
about the quality of judicial decision-making in the face of complex-
ity and about the possibility of changing trial procedures to facilitate 
more rational fact-finding is similarly lacking. 
If the Supreme Court were to determine the scope of the seventh 
amendment now, it would, in the absence of such ·information, have 
two basic options. First, the Court could examine the history and 
jurisprudence of the seventh amendment to determine whether a 
complexity exception would be justified. This option, in eschewing a 
functional approach, renders the empirical questions irrelevant, and, 
as I shall argue in Part II, permits only one good faith decision -
protecting the right to jury trial. Alternatively, the Court could 
adopt the form of a functional approach, but base its analysis on 
what are at best weakly supported intuitions and presumptions. 
The functional approach is the more probable, for the strongest 
argument against the right to jury trial in complex litigation is not 
that the seventh amendment is inapplicable, but that the due process 
clause of the fifth amendment overrides the mandate of the seventh. 
Unless the Court were to hold that one amendment of the Bill of 
Rights could not override another more specifically on point, the 
Justices would, regardless of the quality of the evidence, have to con-
front the question of whether a jury in a complex case could render a 
verdict that was sufficiently fair and rational to comport with the 
demands of due process. 10 However, the absence of valid data might 
cause the Court to slight the other two questions whose resolution 
should inform its decision: namely, whether judges can reach fair 
decisions in cases so complex as to befuddle jurors and whether pro-
cedural innovations in complex cases can improve the quality of jury 
fact-finding. Since judges possess credentials indicative of compe-
tence, and since judicial criticism of jurors' abilities is not counter-
balanced by criticisms of judicial competence, the Supreme Court 
might well follow the lead of the Third Circuit in presuming that 
judges are capable of deciding cases that would confound juries. 
The possibility that we might improve the way complex cases are 
tried to juries might be ignored entirely. Our experience with truly 
innovative trial procedures is so limited that most judgments about 
10. The Court's past intuitions about jury behavior appear, on occasion, to have been 
shaped largely by the outcome desired rather than by a serious examination of available re-
search or a concern for actual experience. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973); 
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscemible" .D!lferences: 
Empirical Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REV. 643 (1975); Zeisel & Diamond, 
"Convincing Empirical Evidence" on the Six-Member Jury, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (1974). 
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the impact of dramatic procedural change would be pure 
speculation. 
If, however, the Court allows the conflict between the circuits to 
continue, or decides the seventh amendment issue so as to preserve 
the competence question, the circuit and district courts will be able 
to explore different approaches to the trial of complex civil actions. 
This would provide the opportunity, particularly if the appropriate 
granting agencies cooperate, for researchers to collect the kinds of 
information that the Court needs to resolve this matter wisely. 
When a fundamental constitutional right is at issue, it is admit-
tedly difficult for the Court to treat the lower courts as laboratories. 
But if the constitutional right turns on empirical questions, it is bet-
ter to wait for knowledge than to rush toward a judgment that may 
later be shown to have vitiated an important right across all circuits. 
If the Court feels compelled to resolve the conflict, the better deci-
sion - if empirical issues are seen as central - is to sustain the right 
to jury trial regardless of complexity. Sustaining that right will allow 
courts and researchers to collect the evidence necessary to test crucial 
empirical assumptions. If it later appears that juries, unlike judges, 
cannot respond rationally to complexity, the Court will be able to 
limit the right to jury trial in the future. The opposite decision, find-
ing an exception to the seventh amendment right, will probably fore-
stall future research, for research opportunities will diminish as jury 
trials in complex cases become less frequent. 11 
In what follows, I argue that the empirical questions on which 
the constitutional analysis should tum may be substantially illumi-
nated by various techniques of social science research. Part II estab-
lishes a starting point - the legal framework that defines the 
relevance of empirical data. Building on this framework, Part III 
discusses research strategies designed to answer the relevant empiri-
cal questions, and Part IV suggests ways that we might change the 
trial of complex cases to lower the likelihood of irrational verdicts. 
II. A LEGAL FRAMEWORK. 
In this Part, I offer four propositions that, taken together, mean 
that the Supreme Court should begin its analysis with a strong pre-
11. Jury trials in complex cases would not necessarily disappear should the Court hold that 
they were not required by the seventh amendment. In some cases both parties might desire a 
jury trial, and trial judges might retain discretion to order jury trials in cases of great complex-
ity. In addition, advisory juries might be used by some judges. Thus, opportunities for explor-
ing jury responses to actual complex cases would still exist if the Court decided against the 
seventh amendment right. These opportunities would, however, diminish, and the sample of 
complex cases tried to juries would probably be biased in a number of ways. 
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sumption that jury trials are required in complex civil litigation. I 
shall argue that the presumption may be rebutted if two hypotheses 
can be proved: (1) the jury system as it now exists or as it might 
possibly be reformed cannot yield fair and rational resolutions of the 
issues raised in complex litigation; and (2) trial judges can reach fair 
and rational resolutions of such issues. 
PROPOSITION ONE: There is, under existing law, little !f any basis for 
reading a complexity exception into the seventh amendment. 
The seventh amendment provides that in "[s]uits at common law, 
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right 
of trial by jury shall be preserved."12 It is standard learning that if in 
1791 a matter was triable as of right to a jury because it was legal, 
the right to try such matters to juries is preserved by the seventh 
amendment. 13 Similarly, it is hombook law that those civil matters 
triable by right to juries are not limited to causes of action that pre-
date 1791.14 Civil statutes. providing remedies that are essentially le-
gal in nature and triable in the federal district courts trigger the 
seventh amendment right regardless of when they are enacted. 15 
Since it is too late in the day to argue that damage actions under 
statutes such as the antitrust laws are not "legal," and since the com-
plexity of a case, by itself, has no bearing on the question of whether 
the action giving rise to that case is essentially legal or equitable, 
opponents of the right to jury trial have taken another tack. They 
have argued that the English courts before 1791 were willing to with .. 
hold the right in certain cases that were legal in nature but so com-
plex as to be thought unsuitable for jury determination.16 This 
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
13. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533 (1970); 5 J. MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE 
f 38.11(2]-[4] (1981); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 92, at 450 (3d ed. 1976). 
14. See 5 J. MooRE, supra note 13, at f 38.11[2]-[4]; C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, at§ 92, at 
450-51. Justice Story was apparently the first to state this principle. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 
U.S. 433, 444 (1830). 
15. Kane, supra note 3, at 271. ("Only when the statute creates what appears to be a novel 
cause of action unknown in 18th century England, or one that was not within the jurisdiction 
of the law court, does it seem totally within the discretion of Congress to decide how that 
action is to be tried."). See also Fleitman v. Welsbach St. Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916); 
Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909). However, Congress can create a remedy that 
either did not exist or was not "legal" in 1791 and rest adjudicatory responsibility in a tribunal 
sitting without ajuxy. See, e.g., Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966) (bankruptcy court); 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (labor board). It is not clear that 
Congress can create a new. cause of action that is essentially legal in nature, rest enforcement 
responsibility in an article ID court, yet deny the right to jury trial. Where such new rights are 
created the Court will not read ambiguous language as reflecting congressional intent to bar 
jury trial. See, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 365-66 (1974) (suit to recover 
possession of real property akin to an action ofejectment); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198 
n.15 (1974) (suit under Title Vlll of the Civil Rights Act). 
16. See Campbell & Le Poideven, SUJfra note 3; Devlin, supra note 3. 
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argument from history has been met by a competing historical 
analysis. 17 
The leading arguments in the historical debate have been pro-
pounded by p~ople who, however disinterested their actual scholar-
ship, were employed by one side in a lawsuit and paid - no doubt 
handsomely - for reaching the results that they did. 18 The nonhis-
t9rian approaching this clash is like a judge who must decide which 
of two conflicting factual accounts makes the most sense. This in-
volves attending more to the form of the opposing arguments and to 
the sources that they cite than to the conclusions that the authors 
draw from their sources. 
As I read the evidence, it appears that the historical test gives 
little comfort to those who wish to read a complexity exception into 
the seventh amendment. There are a few early cases in which 
judges, choosing not to empanel jurjes, disparage the ability of jurors 
to deal with the litigation in question, but these cases appear to in-
volve disputes not remediable at law in the first instance. 19 Even if 
one could discover a case where jury trial was denied although the 
action was unquestionably legal, it would not establish a pattern of 
denying jury trials in complex cases. The case would be more prop-
erly read as an aberrational decision that cannot be the measure of 
the right that the framers of the seventh amendment intended to pre-
serve. Furthermore, those who see the basis for a complexity excep-
tion to the seventh amendment in a few early cases present no 
evidence that the framers knew of the cases that they cite. Since 
none of these cases appears to have been a leading or celebrated one, 
there is little reason to believe that the framers would have been 
aware of them. 
The other pillar of the historical argument concerns the equitable 
action for an accounting. This action, which existed prior to 1791, did 
not involve a jury although the outcome might well have involved an 
order that damages be paid. There is, however, no reason to believe 
that jury trial was denied in such cases because of the complexity of 
17. See Arnold, supra note 3; Arnold, A Modest Replication to a Lengthy .Discourse, 128 
U. PA. L. REV. 986 (1980). 
18. Arnold, supra note 3; Campbell & Le Poideven, supra note 3; Devlin, supra note 3. 
19. See ;rowneley v. Clench [mistakenly named Clench v. Tomley in the report], Cary 23, 
21 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1603) (equitable process was needed to secure documents and testimony). 
It is not clear whether equity secured the requisite documents or enough other evidence so that 
it would have been appropriate for the Court of Chancery to dissolve its injunction and let 
matters proceed at law. See also Blad v. Bahfield, 3 Swan. 604 (App.), 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (Ch. 
1674) (within equitable jurisdiction as an admiralty case); Arnold, supra note 3; Arnold, supra 
note 17; Campbell & Le Poideven, supra note 3. 
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the task. Since the action was in equity, a jury trial was not part of 
the ordinary routine. More importantly, there is no convincing evi-
dence that the action for an accounting was established as an equita-
ble one because the courts feared that juries could not cope with the 
issues such cases presented.20 The equity court's advantage appears 
to have lain not in the judge's ability to handle matters that would 
have confused ordinary jurors, but in procedural devices - espe-
cially discovery devices - that were available in equity but not at 
law.21 Indeed, an action for accounting was available at law, and 
plaintiffs had the option of electing it.22 A plaintiff's option rule is 
hardly consistent with the notion that the jury could not handle the 
matter. If the equitable action came eventually to replace the legal 
one, it did so because plaintiffs perceived that they could do better 
with the aid of equitable procedures, and not because the Chancellor 
was known to be proplaintiff or because plaintiffs magnanimously 
felt that defendants should have a fairer trial than a jury could give 
them. 
What is most notable about the attempts to find an eighteenth-
century complexity exception to the right to jury trial is not the evi-
dence presented, but that which is not given. Like Sherlock 
Holme.<:;'s dog that did not bark, this is the most important evidence 
on the issue. Had there been a complexity exception, we would ex-
pect to see a number of cases that make use of it, but we are not even 
presented with cases where counsel argued fruitlessly for one. We 
would expect the treatise writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries to cite complexity as an explanation for the existence of the 
equitable accounting. We might even expect some sign that the 
framers were aware of a possible ambiguity concerning the scope of 
the seventh amendment in complex litigation. We have not a 
20. Lord Devlin, supra note 3, attempts to make this case, but the bulk of his evidence 
suggests that procedural difficulties attached to the jury trial rather than complexity per se led 
to the equitable accounting. For example, if a jury determined whether an account was neces-
sary, auditors took the account, but the jury had to resolve disagreements. This might have 
necessitated a different jury to hear each disputed issue. Id at 66-67. Most of the language 
that Devlin quotes refers to the difficulties or inconvenience of proceeding at law. Id at 68. 
The language is plausibly interpreted as referring not to the jury's incapacity, but to the proce-
dural advantages of equity. While there apparently were cases where the Chancellor, having 
properly secured jurisdiction, refused to exercise discretion to return the matter to law or to 
seat an advisory jury based on his evaluation of the jury's capacity, such decisions were appar-
ently discretionary with the Chancellor and we are presented with no reason to believe they 
would have justified taking the matter from the jury in the first instance. See, e.g., id at 72-74. 
Equitable remedies clearly arose because fair remedies were unavailable at law, but no case is 
presented in which the lack of an adequate legal remedy resulted primarily from an'. expecta-
tion that jurors would be incompetent to deal with difficult fact situations. · 
21. See Arnold, supra note 3, at 844. 
22. Id at 848. 
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whisper of such concerns.23 Although the crucial evidence may ex-
ist, as yet unfound, this appears unlikely considering the resources 
that lawyers have been willing to pour into cases with hundreds of 
millions of dollars at stake. Thus, even if the cases offered in support 
of a complexity exception were taken at face value and even if com-
plexity were regarded as a plausible explanation for the equitable 
accounting, the historical argument for denying a right to jury trial 
in complex legal actions would be unconvincing. If a complexity 
exception existed, still other traces should remain. Not finding other 
traces, the historical case for a complexity-based exception to the 
seventh amendment appears untenable. 
The other legal argument made by those advocating a complexity 
exception to the seventh amendment is based on footnote ten in Ross 
v . .Bemhard,24 which states: 
As our cases indicate, the "legal" nature of an issue is determined 
by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such 
questions; second, the remedy sought; and third, the practical abilities 
and limitations of juries. Of these factors, the first, requiring extensive 
and possibly abstruse historical inquiry, is obviously the most difficult 
to apply.25 
It is argued by some that the test's third prong, ''the practical abilities 
and limitations of juries," gives judges discretion to deny jury trials 
in complex civil cases. This argument is as implausible as the argu-
ment from history. Not only does the argument require one to be-
lieve that the Court would choose to use a cryptic footnote to 
authorize an important inroad into the seventh amendment right to 
jury trial, but it also ignores both the text accompanying footnote ten 
and the precedential value of Ross. 
Footnotes should be read in connection with the statements to 
which they are appended. Footnote ten follows a sentence that 
reads: "The Seventh Amendment question depends on the nature of 
the issue to be tried rather than the character of the overall action."26 
23. I am indebted to Victoria List for searching the following 18th century treatises: 3 W. 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (London 1763); F. BULLER, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT NISI PRIUS (London 1772); G. DUN-
COMBE, TRIALS PER PAIS (London 1766); G. GILBERT, THE HISTORY AND PRACTICE OF THE 
HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY (London 1758); M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 
(London 1794); M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (London 1763). Ms. List reports that none of 
these works alludes to complexity as a reason for vesting any matter, including accountings, in 
equity or otherwise denying a right to jury trial. It should be noted that 18th century trials 
were generally not complex. Almost all were concluded in less than a day. Also, special juries 
might be available in commercial or other matters. On the use of special juries see Devlin, 
supra note 3, at 8()..83; Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 3; Oakes, supra note 3. 
24. 396 U.S. 531 (1970). 
25. 396 U.S. at 538 n.10. 
26. 396 U.S. at 538 (emphasis added). 
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Thus, even if the footnote were intended to authorize judges in com-
plex cases to deny jury trials regardless of history, they would have 
that authority only on an issue-by-issue basis.27 Only in the rare 
(perhaps nonexistent) case where every issue in a matter historically 
tried at law was too complex to be understood by a group of laymen 
would the judge be authorized to strike a demand for a jury. But 
this reading, which is the broadest that can be given the note in light 
of its associated text, is itself implausible insofar as it suggests that 
courts may withdraw factual questions from the jury on an issue-by-
issue basis. Reading footnote ten this way ignores the basic thrust of 
Ross. 
Ross is one of what may be seen in retrospect as a set of three 
cases that grapple with the vitalizing implications of the merger of 
law and equity for the seventh amendment right to jury trial. These 
cases, Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,28 JJairy Queen v. Wood,29 
and Ross, all involved matters that were distinctively or arguably 
legal, but were so incorporated in actions seeking equitable relief 
that they were triable to a judge.30 To do otherwise in the pre-
27. See Unfit far Jury Determination, supra note 3, at 519-20. 
28. 359 U.S. 500 (1958). 
29. 369 U.S. 469 (1962). 
30. In .Beacon Theatres, the plaintiff had sought declaratory relief and an injunction, pend-
ing resolution of the litigation, to prevent the defendant from instituting an antitrust action 
against the plaintiff. Defendant counterclaimed seeking treble damages under the antitrust 
laws and demanded a jury trial of the factual issues in the case. The trial judge viewed the 
issues in the original complaint as essentially equitable, and directed that those issues be tried 
to the court before a jury passed on the alleged antitrust violations. Had this been done, 
certain factual findings by the judge might have bound the parties in the later jury trial either 
by res judicata or collateral estoppeL Cf. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 333-35 
(1979). The Court held that with the Declaratory Judgment Act and the merger of law and 
equity, the justification for equity's deciding legal issues once it obtained jurisdiction and re-
taining jurisdiction regardless of subsequently available legal remedies must be reevaluated. 
359 U.S. at 509. In the instant case the Court believed that the equitable rights of the plaintiff 
could be fully protected if the legal issues were tried first, and so reversed the decision below. 
Speaking more generally, the Court stated that the seventh amendment requires a court, in 
deciding whether to try a legal or equitable claim first, to preserve jury trial wherever possible. 
359 U.S. at 5f0. 
Dairy Queen involved an action arising out of a trademark dispute in which injunctions 
were sought as well as an accounting and payment of the money that the accounting revealed 
as owing. The Court held that the right to jury trial may not be lost simply because legal issues 
are characterized as "incidental" to equitable issues. 369 U.S. at 473. The Court also looked 
behind the label "accounting," and found the suit to be basically an action for damages under 
a breach of contract or trademark infringement theory. It suggested that, given the power of 
the district courts to appoint Masters to assist juries, cases in which accounts between the 
parties were so complicated that only equity could unravel them would be very rare indeed. 
369 U.S. at 478. ' 
Ross held that the right to jury trial preserved by the seventh amendment extends to a 
stockholder's derivative suit (historically available only in equity) with respect to those issues 
as to which the corporation, had it been suing in its own right, would have been entitled to a 
jury trial 
78 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 80:68 
merger days would have required separate proceedings, duplicative 
fact-finding, and inevitable expense and delay. In each case, the 
Court read the seventh amendment to require what the merger of 
law and equity had made practicable -jury trial of the legal issues 
in actions whose primary purpose was to secure equitable relief. The 
question in each case was whether the seventh amendment required 
what was, in effect, an extension of the right to jury trial; in none was 
there any question of restricting that right. 
Seen in this context, footnote ten in Ross cannot mean that a 
court may strike a demand for jury trial whenever a legal action 
promises to be particularly complex, for the question of when a court 
may limit a previously existing right to jury trial was not raised in 
Ross. The footnote is instead addressed to the question of when a 
court need not grant jury trial on an issue that arises in an action 
seeking equitable relief. Although the precise meaning of note ten is 
not clear, the fact that it addresses the question of when jury trial is 
required on issues rather than in cases renders several readings plau-
sible. One reading is that we have a lexically ordered test. If an 
issue was considered legal before the merger of law and equity and 
was ordinarily triable to a jury, then there is a right to jury trial 
under the merged procedure even though the issue would have been 
incidentally triable to a judge in premerger cases seeking equitable 
relief. On the other hand, if an issue has historically been considered 
equitable and tried to a judge, it remains triable to a judge because 
there is no right to jury trial for the seventh amendment to preserve. 
If this inquiry fails to resolve the matter (most likely because the 
matter might be characterized in two ways, and was properly for the 
jury if the action were legal and properly for- rather than inciden-
tally given to - the judge if the matter were equitable), one reaches 
the second prong of the test: Does the issue in the merged procedure 
relate to a remedy that is essentially legal or essentially equitable? If 
legal, the right to jury trial must be extended; if equitable, the judge 
may decide the issue. If this inquiry does not resolve the matter, 
perhaps because the cause of action is newly created with a unique 
remedy, one reaches the third prong of the Ross test. If the issue 
appears to be within the practical limitations and abilities of juries, 
jury trial is required, but not otherwise. Interpreting footnote ten of 
Ross in this way means that the first prong is always dispositive if 
investigation under this head yields an unequivocal answer; if not, 
one turns to the second prong. Only when neither of these tests indi-
cates whether a jury is required does one reach the third prong. In 
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short, the second test can never trump the :first, and the third can 
never trump the second. 
This reading of footnote ten accords well with the language and 
jurisprudence of the seventh amendment, both of which rely heavily 
on history to determine the scope of the jury trial requirement. If an 
issue has historically been within the special province of a jury ex-
cept when incidental to an equitable action, history controls and the 
issue is for the jury to decide. If history does not specifically control, 
one looks to the nature of the relief requested. If that relief was his-
torically available at law, the issue is for the jury to decide. If the 
relief sought was historically within the province of equity, the mat-
ter is for the judge. If history provides no answer, the issue is for the 
jury unless the practicalities of the trial or the limitations of the jury 
suggest otherwise. 
This reading is also consistent with Ross, for the Ross Court 
looks first at whether the issue was historically within the special 
province of the judge or the jury, and finding history equivocal, it 
looks at the nature of the relief sought. Having characterized the 
action as legal, the Court never treats the abilities or limitations of 
juries. 
Other readings of the Ross footnote relax the lexical ordering 
that this analysis imposes but are somewhat less plausible. One 
might argue that Ross's third prong -the so-called functional test 
- comes into play if the first two prongs lead in different directions. 
Although this reading is consistent with the Ross opinion, it is less 
faithful to the historical approach that has characterized seventh 
amendment jurisprudence and might conceivably remove from the 
jury's consideration an issue entrusted to it in 179L Another reading 
would treat the three prongs as factors that must be weighed together 
in a balancing process. However, this reading not .only works a sub-
stantial change in the jurisprudence of the seventh amendment, it is 
also inconsistent with the Court's analysis in Ross. 
To sum up, the Supreme Court cannot in good faith discover a 
complexity exception to the seventh amendment in either history or 
in its past pronouncements. Thus, a lower court seeking to be faith-
ful to history and Supreme Court precedent cannot strike a jury de-
mand in any case which, if it were less complex, would entail a 
seventh amendment right to a jury trial. 
This does not mean that those seeking to strike jury demands in 
complex civil cases will be unaided by the historical research that 
like-minded litigants have sponsored or by the Ross footnote. If the 
Court wishes to abrogate the right to jury trial in complex cases, it 
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may, as it has in other instances, use a conflict among scholars as 
evidence that history is unknowable or that opposing positions are 
equally plausible.31 By bowing to rather than critically examining 
conflicting scholarship, the Court may avoid confronting matters 
that would otherwise pose serious intellectual difficulties - here the 
fact that allowing a complexity exception would contravene the rela-
tively specific language of the seventh amendment and almost 200 
years of seventh amendment jurisprudence. 
If the Court decides to carve a complexity exception out of the 
seventh amendment, it will almost certainly cite the Ross footnote. 
Its third prong is the Court's first suggestion that a functional test has 
any place in explicating the scope of the seventh amendment. If my 
analysis is correct, however, the footnote means that a court's beliefs 
about the jury's capabilities cannot outweigh the implications of his-
tory. It is certainly not a precedent - as the Ross case in which it is 
embedded is not a precedent - for limiting the scope of the seventh 
amendment. Nevertheless, because the Court sanctioned a func-
tional approach when deciding how far to expand the right to jury 
trial, it may feel that using a functional approach to impose limits on 
the seventh amendment does not radically depart from its prece-
dents. This feeling may be justified in the sense that the Ross lan-
guage has alerted lawyers to the need to argue the jury capability 
question to the Court, thus lessening the surprise associated with 
radical breaks in past jurisprudence. But it will not be justified if it 
emerges as a pretension that limiting the right to jury trial on func-
tional grounds is but a step down a path that was implicit in Ross. 
PROPOSITION Two: Lay decision-making in the civil sphere promotes 
important social values. 
When the institution of jury trial is celebrated, what is typically 
praised is the criminal jury. The great cases that lead us to associate 
jury trials with liberty are criminal prosecutions, many of which pre-
date the American Revolution.32 When we acknowledge the value 
31. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184-85 (1976), where Justice Stewart could 
cite only one study finding a deterrent effect to capital punishment to support his contention 
that the results of statistical attempts to evaluate the death penalty as a deterrent have been 
inconclusive. The study that Justice Stewart relied upon, [Ehrlich, The .Deterrent Effect of Cap-
ital Punishment: A Question of Lift and .Death, 65 AM. EcoN. REv. 397 (1975)], is funda-
mentally flawed and has been soundly criticized by numerous scholars. For a review of the 
critical literature, see Lempert, .Desert and .Detellence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the 
Case far Capital .Punishment, 19 MICH. L. REv. 1177, 1206-13 (1981). 
32. The most famous case on the American side was the trial of John Peter Zenger. But 
the colonists knew of and no doubt celebrated the jury's role in a number of cases tried in 
England. See, e.g., Rex v. Shipley, 99 Eng. Rep. 774 (K.B. 1784); Rex v. Owen, 18 How. St. 
Tr. 1203 (K.B. 1752); Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670). 
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of an institution that ameliorates the rigors of the law with an infu-
sion of communal values, we are usually thinking of the criminal 
jury and its "nullification" of criminal statutes either because they 
are employed to quash dissent or because they seem inappropriately 
severe. The civil jury seems less important to our freedom because it 
does not decide whether named individuals should go free. Nor is it 
easy to think of civil cases that carry the symbolic weight of cele-
brated criminal trials. Although civil juries may hear cases in which 
the state is a party, such cases are neither paradigmatic nor routine 
grist for their mill. Even when it is the state that brings suit against a 
citizen, an assumption of equality between the parties - reflected in 
the "preponderance of evidence" standard - is taken to mean that 
the citizen needs no special protection. 
Results in civil cases are admittedly important to the parties, but 
are rarely seen as consequential to society as a whole. The larger 
social significance of whether a contract is voided or sustained or 
whether a parcel of condemned land is valued at twelve rather than 
ten thousand dollars is not obvious. Indeed, the Court has paid the 
civil jury its ''ultimate" insult, for it has never held that the seventh 
amendment is, as part of the Bill of Rights, incorporated into the 
fourteenth amendment and thus binding on the states. More than 
anything else, this distinguishes the civil jury of the seventh amend-
ment from the criminal jury of the sixth amendment. The former is 
not, in the Court's view, essential to the constitutional scheme of or-
dered liberty. 
The framers of the seventh amendment might well have been 
surprised by these attitudes, for there is little reason to believe that 
they thought the civil jury less important than its criminal counter-
part. They certainly saw close ties between economic and political 
freedom. The civil jury, as Professor Wolfram has shown, was seen 
to safeguard freedom because it could ameliorate the rigidities of the 
law and render harmless the biases of judges.33 
Indeed, it may well be that the social impact of the civil jury has 
been greater than that of its criminal counterpart. Many important 
statutory and common-law developments have grown out of the ten-
sion between the apparent requirements of legal rules and the ver-
dicts that civil juries returned. The wisdom of the common man as 
reflected in the civil jury verdicts of one generation has often pre-
saged the wisdom of the next generation's legal elites. The move-
ment toward comparative negligence, which is reputed to have long 
33. See Wolfram, supra note 3. 
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been the rule in the jury box, is but one example.34 The availability 
of jury trial has also affected the balance of power on important leg-
islative matters. Interests powerful enough to control legislatures 
and perhaps judges have found that the one-sided rules they champi-
oned did not fully survive jury deliberations. This has apparently 
led to compromises between interest groups that would otherwise 
have been absent or much delayed. The best example is the move-
ment toward worker's compensation. The movement was initially 
resisted by industry, but eventually generated considerable industrial 
support in part because the fellow servant rule and the assumption of 
risk doctrine provided but uncertain protection when matters were 
ambiguous enough to be given to a jury.35 
For some people, the possibility of nullification by the civil jury 
militates against extending the right to jury trial in civil cases and, 
indeed, provides a reason to regret the adoption of the seventh 
amendment.36 By the same token, some may regret the enactment of 
the sixth amendment because juries may interfere with unbridled 
governmental power at times when dominant elites think unbridled 
discretion necessary. But the requirement of jury trial was incorpo-
rated into the Bill of Rights precisely because of the possibility that 
those who were most powerful at any particular time would conceive 
of the jury as an obstacle to their particular agendas. The Supreme 
Court, therefore" should take the seventh amendment seriously and 
respect its underlying purpose even if the Justices are uneasy with 
the idea that the civil jury might "nullify" the law in cases that are 
neither overtly political nor obvious occasions for mercy. 
Those most worried about nullification in civil cases may find 
comfort in two considerations. First, as with the criminal jury, the 
civil jury's war with the law is likely to be a small one. If Kalven 
and Zeisel's seminal research may be taken as a guide, civil jurors do 
not often ignore a rule that indisputably applies merely because they 
think that the rule is wrong. Their sense of justice is likely to be 
crucial only when facts in a case are close and it is not unreasonable 
to decide either way.37 Second, the civil jury, like its criminal coun-
34. See Green, Juries and Justice - the Jury's Role in Personal Injury Cases, 1962 U. ILL. 
L.F. 152, 159. But see Kalven, 'I7te .Dignity of the Civil.fury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055, 1066 (1964). 
35. Friedman & Ladinsk.y, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 61 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 50, 62 (1967). 
3~. See, e.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 127-35 (1949). 
37. This is apparently the case with the criminal jury. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE 
AMERICAN JURY (1966) (hereinafter cited as KALVEN & ZEisEL]. It appears that it is even 
more likely to be true of the civil jury. Kalven and Zeise! report almost the same level of 
judge-jury disagreement in criminal and civil cases. The difference is that on four out of five 
occasions where the criminal jury disagrees with the judge the jury is more lenient, but where 
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terpart, appears to have performed well even if popular values haye 
at times mitigated the literal demands of the law. The tension be-
tween rules and morality that characterizes our system of trial by 
jury has not noticeably hampered economic growth, and has argua-
bly advanced the cause of social justice. 
This analysis suggests that the civil jury helps promote important 
(albeit disputable) values enshrined by the framers in the seventh 
amendment. But there is a narrower issue lurking here. It is not 
obvious that the values the framers sought to promote will be even 
minimally subverted should jury trial be denied in a small number 
of exceedingly complex cases that involve both voluminous evidence 
and technical matters like statistical analysis and economic theory. 
In the first place, where legal issues tum on technical evidence and 
esoteric theory, it is not clear that a community as represented by its 
jurors has values that are particularly relevant to the outcome. In-
deed, jurors instructed to decide between litigants like IBM and 
Memorex on the basis of their own values rather than the law might 
not know which way their values lead. Second, the political and so-
cial influence of the civil jury has apparently been greatest when 
routine cases were heard by jury after jury. The symbolic decision 
that can stop the government in its tracks and call for a reassessment 
of official policy is largely missing from the civil sphere. Complex 
litigation, on a scale to justify the denial of jury trial, may be so rare 
or so esoteric that we should not expect the system of jury trial to 
ameliorate any rigidity or class biases of the law with a sense of pop-
ular justice. 
Although the above argument is reasonable, the assumptions on 
which it is based are not indisputably true. In the face of empirical 
uncertainty it is probably wiser - and certainly more faithful to the 
Constitution - to accept the framers~ judgment and allow jury trial 
in all cases denominated "legal." The presence of great complexity 
or of esoteric issues does not necessarily mean that there will be no 
aspects of complex cases that arouse a popular sense of justice. 
Some kinds of arguably predatory business activity, for example, 
might seem either so unfair or so unreasonable that, if the issue is a 
close one, it is appropriate for juries to give the benefit of the doubt 
to the party that has acted with the greater morality. Also, there is a 
"slippery slope" problem. Today there may be only a handful of 
cases that are acknowledged candidates for applying the complexity 
exception. But once the seventh amendment's command is 
the civil jury disagrees with the judge, it is about as likely to find for the plaintiff as for the 
defendant. Id at 63. See also Kalven, supra note 34. 
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breached, the number of cases might rise dramatically. First, one 
might require the prospect of voluminous evidence and esoteric is-
sues to justify dispensing with a jury trial. Then either voluminous 
evidence or esoteric issues might be enough. Finally, the meaning of 
voluminous evidence and esoteric issues could change so that evi-
dence that will take two weeks to present is considered voluminous, 
and difficult engineering questions in products liability cases are 
considered esoteric.38 These problems are exacerbated by the nature 
of legal practice in high stakes cases. If a jury trial can be avoided if 
a case promises to be complex, it is a safe bet that the party prefer-
ring a bench trial will do its best to create the prospect of a lengthy 
trial that will tum on esoteric expert testimony. 
Finally it must be recognized that complex cases - such as large-
scale antitrust litigation - are some of the most "political" cases that 
the system hears. Vast sums of money are involved, and the struc-
ture of the nation's largest companies may be at issue. The power of 
businesses vis-a-vis consumers is inescapably implicated. Even if the 
litigation is so complicated that the jurors have no popular view of 
where justice lies (apart from the legal test) and no understanding of 
the political implications of different decisions, judges may well have 
such a view and such understanding. Unlike most jurors, judges 
have often been either personally involved in politics or experienced 
in
1 
representing clients before political bodies. In recent years, more-
over, a number of judges have received formal training in economics 
- at no personal expense - from an institute that reportedly takes a 
decidedly partisan view of the kinds of economic policy questions 
that are commonly implicated in complex litigation.39 In short, 
judges will have a good idea of the consequences that different ver-
dicts entail, and they may strongly prefer one outcome to another. If 
the jury does not infuse popular morality into cases that are so com-
plex as to defy the layperson's sense of the moral, it may play the 
equally important role - and one also contemplated by the framers 
- of preventing judgments in such important cases from being dom-
inated by the morality of an elite.40 
38. Recently the trial judge refused to seat a jury in a dispute involving Howard Hughes's 
competence to enter into certain contracts and the alleged overreaching of people close to him. 
There is apparently a substantial amount of documentary evidence that will be admissible, but 
it doesn't appear from news accounts that the presentation of evidence must consume months 
of court time and the issues, which tum in large part on the credibility of witnesses, appear 
well-suited for jury consideration. See Granelli, Howard Hughes - Lucid or JJrugged, NATL, 
LJ., Sept. 14, 1981, at 6, col I. 
39. See Guzzardi, Judges JJiscover the World of Economics, FORTUNE, May 21, 1979, at S8, 
66. 
40. Wolfram, supra note 3. 
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PROPOSITION THREE: The decision on the right to jury trial in complex 
civil litigation should _proceed on the assumption that the outcomes of 
particular cases will tum on the decision. 
When the Supreme Court decided that the sixth amendment al-
lowed six-member juries in state criminal cases, Justice White sug-
gested that there were "no discernible differences" between the 
verdicts rendered by six- and twelve-person juries.41 This observa-
tion was repeated in Colegrove v. Battin,42 which sanctioned the use 
of six-person juries in federal civil cases. The judgment of the Court 
was almost certainly mistaken, although for a variety of reasons both 
experimental and real world research are unlikely to reveal substan-
tial differences between the verdicts of six and the verdicts of 
twelve.43 It will, if anything, be even more difficult to identify spe-
cific complex cases in which the verdict will turn on whether a jury is 
empaneled. Nevertheless, it would be a grave mistake to assume 
that because a difference is not amenable to measurement, it does 
not exist. First, that assumption is inconsistent with the hypothesis 
on which the case against the civil jury is grounded - namely, that 
juries but not judges are incompetent to deal rationally with comple~ 
civil cases. Second, the parties who dispute the right to jury trial in 
complex cases clearly believe that empaneling a jury is likely to af-
fect the trial's outcome. · 
This last point is an important one to remember in evaluating ~e 
arguments in right to jury trial litigation. Whatever the language in 
which the arguments are cloaked, due process, popular sovereignty, 
or fidelity to history, the parties who bring these cases ultimately dif-
fer on only one issue - whether they expect their client to be better 
off before a jury or a judge. Indeed, since the parties will know 
which judge has been assigned the case before they must make a 
demand for jury trial or a motion to strike that demand,44 arguments 
over jury trial may be motivated more by the perceived sympathies 
of a known judge than by the predicted biases and competence of a 
still to be selected jury. It would be interesting to see how decisions 
to seek or avoid jury trial would be affected if the appropriate mo-
41. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 101 (1970). 
42. 413 U.S. 149, 158-59 (1973). 
43. See Lempert, supra note 10. The Supreme Court itself has noted that studies that 
purported to document the irrelevance of jury size, studies relied upon by the Court in Col-
grove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) (holding that a six-member civil jury did not violate the 
seventh amendment right to a jury trial), have been criticized by scholars. Ballew v. Georgia, 
435 U.S. 223, 237-39 & nn.30-32 (1978). 
44. Demands for a jury trial are made after the commencement of an action and are timely 
until 10 days after the service of the last pleading directed to an issue triable of right by a jury. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 38. 
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tions had to be made before the judge was assigned. It would be 
even more interesting to see how many parties would move to strike 
juries from complex cases if that motion waived the movant's right 
to jury trial in any subsequent litigation of equal or greater 
complexity. 
However one resolves these thought experiments, the Court 
should respect the judgment of the litigators and approach the ques-
tion of the right to jury trial as if the fate of not only a particular 
lawsuit but also a whole class of lawsuits turned on it. The impor-
tance of a matter usually argues in favor of Supreme Court resolu-
tion. When the available information is insufficient for an intelligent 
judgment, however, the importance of a decision is further reason to 
postpone making it. 
PROPOSITION FouR: The fifth amendment conditions the command of 
the seventh amendment so that there is no right to jury trial in cases so 
complex that lay fact-finders cannot rationally assess the facts in light 
of the law, provided (a) trial judges can rationally make such assess-
ments; (b) the jury's deficiencies cannot be ameliorated by reasonable 
procedural innovation; and (c) a right to jury trial is retained for those 
signtficant legal issues that a jury can rationally resolve. 
, .If juries simply cannot decide complex cases rationally and 
judges can, no good purpose is served by requiring jury trial. This is 
true even if we believe that the seventh amendment requires us to 
accept the possibility of limited jury nullification in civil cases as a 
valued part of our system.45 Nullification, as we have come to value 
it, entails a reasoned decision that rationally elevates certain commu-
nal values above the specific language of the law. Verdicts that stem 
from misunderstandings of the law or from an inability to assess 
complex facts do not nullify the law so much as they frustrate it. 
There is certainly no reason to believe that the drafters of the sixth 
and seventh amendments valued the jury system because it offered 
the opportunity for lay irrationality. Indeed, if we see nullification 
for what it usually is - the tendency of jurors to let their values 
affect their reading of the facts in close cases - we realize that nulli-
fication may itself be frustrated by complexity. If jurors cannot un-
45. Henderson has shown that when the seventh amendment was adopted there were in 
England, as well as in some states, judicial control devices designed to prevent civil juries from 
returning irrational or unsupportable verdicts or to prevent such verdicts from being enforced. 
Henderson, Tlze Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289,299 (1966). Bui 
cf. Wolfram, supra note 3 (seventh amendment framers viewed the jury as a check on the 
morality of the elite). 
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derstand the issues in a case, they cannot be sure what decision or 
benefit of doubt their values imply. 
Although nullification is uniquely associated with juries, it is not 
the only reason for jury trial. Jury trial emerged as the dominant 
way to resolve legal disputes because it appeared more rational than 
competing procedures.46 If juries had not been capable of rational 
fact-finding, the institution would no doubt have disappeared long 
before the framers enshrined it in the Bill of Rights. However highly 
one values the jury system, little of value is preserved by retaining 
juries that cannot function rationally because the concepts on which 
a case turns are too abstruse for jurors to understand or because the 
quantity of relevant information overcomes their capacity for ra-
tional evaluation. 
In these circumstances, despite the seventh amendment's clear 
command and the political importance of the civil jury, there is good 
reason to withdraw what appears to be a right. Litigants may appro-
priately claim whatever benefits accrue when jurors use their values 
to resolve doubt in close cases, but no litigant has a claim to the 
benefits that the possibility of an irrational verdict bring. Indeed, a 
lawyer would be acting unethically if he brought a case knowing th.at 
it could only be won if the jury misunderstood the evidence;47 if the 
lawyer's client prevailed in such a case because the jury did misun-
derstand, the judge would be obliged to overturn the verdict.48 i 
The availability of directed verdicts and judgments n.o. v. makes 
it clear that the seventh amendment does not guarantee a right to 
benefit from verdicts that run counter to the clear implications of the 
evidence. Nevertheless, the case for striking a jury demand when 
complexity threatens is an uneasy one. It cannot legitimately rest on 
an interpretation of the seventh amendment, but must instead rely 
on the due process clause of the fifth amendment. But relying on the 
fifth amendment is discomfiting. Contrary to the usual canons of 
statutory construction, this approach prefers general language to spe-
cific language. More importantly, the approach stands the incorpo-
ration process on its head. Over the years, the Supreme Court has 
held that many of the protections of the Bill of Rights are binding on 
the states because they are aspects of the due process that the four-
46. For a brief sketch of the emergence of jury trial, see Devlin, supra note 3, at 45-48. 
47. See ABA, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, DR7-102 and the accompanying 
ethical considerations. 
48. This might be done by ordering a new trial or entering judgment n.o.v. See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 50 & 59. 
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teenth amendment requires.49 Indeed, some have come to view the 
specific provisions of the Bill of Rights as the basic measure of what 
due process entails. 50 To rest the denial of the right to jury trial on 
due process grounds, one must see due process (albeit fifth amend-
ment due process) as requiring the denial of one of the specific pro-
cedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 
As Proposition Four indicates, I am prepared to read the due 
process clause this way. Fifth amendment due process has over the 
years become one of the fundamental values of the Bill of Rights, 
while the seventh amendment has remained peripheral. Only re-
cently have some courts suggested that trial by jury might in itself be 
inconsistent with due process, but due process has been used to limit 
the jury in the past. In particular, due process was cited as a justifi-
cation for taking away whatever law-deciding powers might, in 1791, 
have been thought to inhere in juries.51 Furthermore, although the 
right to jury trial in civil cases has, by virtue of the seventh amend-
ment, been part of the process due in federal court, it has not been 
thought so central to our system of justice as to be required of the 
states. 52 If the right to jury trial in civil cases is not required by 
fourteenth amendment due process, it is presumably not required by 
fifth amendment due process either. 
Due process gives one the right to present one's case to a fact-
finder capable of understanding the law and comprehending the evi-
dence. The seventh amendment gives one the right to trial by at 
least six laypersons.53 If a case is so complex that lay jurors cannot 
understand the law or comprehend the evidence, there is a clash of 
constitutional rights. The possibility of such a clash is not eliminated 
by the availability of judgment n.o. v., since a jury verdict may result 
from a failure to understand the law or evidence without being so 
obviously against the weight of the evidence that it may be over-
turned by a judge not privy to the jury's deliberations. The losing 
party is harmed if a fact-finder that understood ·both the law and the 
evidence would have reached the opposite verdict. 
But even if due process entitles a litigant to a nonjury trial, it 
49. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11-2, at 567-68 (1978) (collecting 
cases). 
SO. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
51. See Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156-U.S. 51, 103 (1895). 
52. See Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876). 
53. Colegrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 160 (1973). The Court in Colegrove expressed no 
view on the question ''whether any number less than six would suffice." 413 U.S. at 159-60. In 
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), however, the Court held that the use of a five-person 
jury in a state criminal case violated the fourteenth amendment. 
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does not follow that there is a right to have a jury demand struck 
merely because a case promises to be complex. When a court grants 
a motion to strike a jury demand because of complexity, it is predict-
ing both that the trial will be particularly complex and that the jury 
will fail to understand the law or the evidence. Surely these judg-
ments can be made more accurately at the trial's end. Arguably, due 
process only gives a litigant the right to have a case withdrawn from 
the jury after the evidence is in and after the judge has determined 
that the jurors as a group have so misunderstood the evidence or the 
judge's instructions as to be incapable of rational deliberation. 
The argument that due process requires judges to strike juries in 
complex cases at the outset of the trial rests on several grounds. The 
first is that it may cost more to try a case to a jury than to a judge. 
But the due process right is not to avoid the expenses of litigation; it 
is to avoid an irrational verdict. Moreover, it is not clear what added 
expenses are attributable to the use of juries, and if such expenses 
can be identified, some portion may be properly chargeable to the 
losing party.54 
The second argument for striking juries at the outset is that 
judges may be unduly reluctant to take cases away from juries. This 
argument is conceptually weak since the law assumes that judges will 
act as they should, but it may be empirically sound. A judge may 
ignore signs of jury misunderstanding because he believes that a jury 
deserves a chance to reach a decision after sitting through a lengthy 
case or because the judge wishes to avoid the burden of deciding the 
matter himself. 
Finally, there are practical reasons for not seating jurors in com-
plex cases when it appears likely that the case will ultimately be 
taken from them. A complex jury trial places tremendous burdens 
on the litigants, on the judge, and, perhaps most of all, on the jurors 
who hear the case. It may also burden entire court systems. Bench 
trials not only spare jurors the disruption that lengthy trials entail, 
but also may ease the burdens on the other actors and on the local 
court because of the greater flexibility that bench trials make possi-
ble. 55 If due process considerations make it likely that a case will be 
withdrawn from the jury before deliberations, it might be worth risk-
ing an occasional mistake to secure the logistical benefits that can 
54. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d) and the discussion of taxable costs in IO C. 
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2665-2679 (1973 & Supp. 
1980). 
55. Some trial judges certainly seem to think so. See, e.g., In re United States Financial 
Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 713-15 (S.D. Cal. 1977), revd, 609 F.2d 91 I (9th Cir. 1979); In 
re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 104-05 (W.D. Wash. 1976). 
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accompany bench trials. 56 
One might think that practical considerations like these, which 
have little to do with due process, should be given no weight when a 
clash of constitutional values must be resolved. Yet Justices who are 
charged with overseeing the federal courts as well as with upholding 
constitutional rights may be more influenced by perceived practicali-
ties than by doctrinal analysis. When the issue is not the fundamen-
tal one of whether jury trial must be allowed, but is instead a 
question of timing, attention to practicalities may be wise. There is 
virtue in avoiding unnecessary costs and in sparing citizens the expe-
rience of sitting through lengthy trials only to be dismissed at the 
close of the evidence because the court doubts their capacity for ra-
tional fact-finding. Yet the case for striking juries at the outset of 
complex cases remains weak, even if the due process claim to a non-
jury verdict is strong, unless we can predict when the likely complex-
ity of a case means that seating jurors will be futile. Not only do we 
not know whether we can accurately make such predictions, we can-
not yet be certain that this will ever be the case. 
The preceding analysis assumes that if the fifth amendment's due 
process clause conflicts with the right to jury trial of the seventh 
amendment, due process should prevail. Given the respective posi-
tions of the two amendments in our constitutional scheme, I believe 
this assumption is defensible. However, because we are dealing with 
two clauses of the Bill of Rights we should be certain that conflict 
actually exists and that there is no practicable way to avoid a clash 
before the rights guaranteed by one amendment are held to override 
those guaranteed by the other. The three provisos of my fourth 
proposition specify circumstances in which a clash is not inevitable 
even if the fact-finding in complex cases tried to juries is not cur-
rently rational. 
First, there is no clash if the judge shares the jury's deficiencies in 
dealing with complex cases or has other deficiencies that render him 
equally incapable of reaching a rational judgment in accordance 
with the law. A party's due process right is not to avoid jury trial; 
56. Bench trials may also be more manageable than jury trials because the rules of evi-
dence, although nominally the same in bench and jury trials, are typically relaxed when trial is 
to the judge. Absent some clear indication that the judge relied upon inadmissible evidence in 
reaching his decision, appellate courts usually are willing to assume that the judge disregarded 
such evidence in rendering his verdict. Thus, arguments over the admissibility of evidence are 
likely to consume less time in bench trials than in jury trials. Also the judge in reaching a 
decision is likely to have information that would have been kept from a jury. Whether this is 
desirable depends on, among other things, the probative value of the additional evidence, 
whether it increases the complexity of the case, and whether one regards fidelity to the rules of 
evidence as a virtue. 
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rather, it is to receive a fair judgment based on a rational evaluation 
of the evidence. If the judge cannot perform any better than the 
jury, there may be a due process right not to be sued at all,57 but 
there is no right to have a judge rather than a jury confounded by the 
evidence. 58 
The supposition that both judges and juries might be irrational 
fact-finders in complex cases is not fanciful. Just as a jury may not 
include people likely to comprehend the details of complex cases, so 
a judge, assigned at random, may not be well-equipped to cope with 
complexity. Many judges are bright and diligent, but others are 
much less so, and a legal education does not mean that one will have 
more than a layperson's understanding of such subjects as economics 
and statistics. Furthermore, a judge lacks the advantages of collec-
tive decision-making, such as group memory and a mix of biases.59 
57. There is at least an analogy in cases where pretrial publicity is such that a fair trial is 
not possible. However, it appears unlikely that the prospect of irrational decision-making in 
civil cases would ever be so clear that the Court would disallow a judicial proceeding. If the 
Court did this, it would not necessarily deny plaintiffs all remedies because the Congress could 
in these circumstances establish expert administrative tribunals tq deal with the matter. The 
problem of disallowing a suit for complexity poses particular problems if the insurmountable 
complexity inheres only in the case of the party seeking to avoid judicial trial. In these circum-
stances, the Court would probably have to determine how essential the complex features of the 
party's case were to a fair presentation of its position. 
58. My colleague Ed Cooper has made the interesting suggestion that if substantive legal 
principles create a decisional task that is too complex for rational jury decision, it is the sub-
stantive law rather than the right to jury trial that must be bent to accommodate the Constitu-
tion. This argument may be made from either of two perspectives. One is the due process 
perspective: Since there is a seventh amendment right to jury trial, due process imposes a jury 
rationality limitation on the freedom of courts and legislatures to complicate substantive law 
beyond reasonable measure. The other is the direct seventh amendment perspective: Courts 
and legislatures have an obligation to preserve the right to jury trial in shaping substantive 
law. The two perspectives may have different consequences. At least superficially, the direct 
seventh amendment argument could be met without altering substantive law by denying any 
complex litigation exception to the right to jury trial, leaving individual juries free to protect 
themselves by an ad hoc process of nullification. The due process perspective may suggest that 
such ad hoc JUry nullification is unfair, particularly in light of the equal protection component 
of fifth amendment due process. The due process approach thus would lead more directly to 
the conclusion that announced principles of substantive law must' change. The same conclu-
sion could be reached from a seventh amendment perspective, however, by arguing that the 
jury itself is entitled to guidance by substantive principles that are intelligible to its members. 
59. See Lempert, supra note 10, at 648. See generally Haft, Business .Decisions hy the New 
Board· Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1981). 
It might be argued that the judge has other resources that more than compensate for the 
disadvantages of deciding alone. For example, one judge may not be able to remember as 
much of the evidence as twelve jurors, but the availability of the trial transcript may mean that 
his,"e.lfective" memory is both more extensive and more accurate than the jury's. To the ex-
tent that this is true, it argues for giving the jurors access to the transcript. If this is done, the 
advantages of group memory should again exist, although in a different and perhaps less im-
portant form. When a transcript is voluminous, one must remember what parts are important 
and worth referring to. A single individual is likely to remember less as important than a 
group or, if the entire transcript is reread, one person is likely to recall less than a group. The 
judge does, however, have an advantage that may offset the jury's greater capacity to remem-
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The problems that complex litigation poses for rational fact-find-
ing are in many ways more an aspect of the litigation than they are a 
function of the fact-finder. Education and intelligence aid in coping 
with the problems of complexity, but they provide no guarantee that 
the final decision will not reflect either biases that have been "liber-
ated" by the ambiguity of complexity or irrationality attributable to 
misunderstood evidence and unremembered information. As evi-
dence becomes voluminous, trials protracted, and issues more tech-
nical, the capacity of any person or group to remember information, 
to understand what is important, and to reach rational decisions di-
minishes. Thus, the best strategies for coping with complex litigation 
may be those that reduce complexity rather than those that focus on 
the fact-finder. ~ 
If, however, we choose to foqus on the fact-finder, and if neither 
judge nor jury is particularly well equipped to deal rationally with 
the mass of evidence and the technical issues that confront them, 
there are substantial reasons to prefer a jury trial. First, if the jury 
makes an obvious mistake in a case, the judge can correct the jury's 
error by entering a judgment n.o.v. 60 But where the jury is correct 
when the judge would have been in error, judgment n.o. v. is unlikely 
to be entered because a correct verdict should appear reasonable 
even to one who would reach the opposite conclusion.61 Without a 
jury, the judge, by hypothesis, would have reached a mistaken 
verdict.62 
ber. Because the judge understands the law much better than the jury, he is likely to be better 
able to identify those portions of the testimony that are most relevant. 
60. For a discussion of the standard that is applied when ruling on motions for judgment 
n.o. v. see note 129 infra and accompanying text. 
61. Although we are assuming that the judge and the jury will on the average be equally 
confused by complexity, in a given case one is likely to reach a more rational decision than the 
other. In a case where the judge is more rational and the jury decision is irrational, the judge 
is likely to realize this and enter a judgment n.o. v. If the jury is more rational in a given case, 
the judge may come to see the error of his reasoning when thinking about reasons for the jury 
verdict. 
62. There is, of course, a wide range of cases in which judge and jury disagree, but neither 
decision is' unreasonable. It is possible that in these cases the judge's decision would better 
reflect the facts and the law. If, however, neither judge nor jury are well-equipped to deal with 
the case - and this is the hypothesis on which the discussion here proceeds - it is only in the 
subset of cases that the judge understands but the jury does not and in which a verdict for 
either side is reasonable that we would be better off with a bench trial. This is presumably 
offset by the subset of cases that the jury deals with more rationally than the judge although 
the judge's verdict would be reasonable. , 
It inay also be the case that the most we should ask of fact-finders hearing exceedingly 
complex cases is that the verdict be within the bounds of reason. Like the classic figure-ground 
paradoxes (is it a vase or two profiles?), there may not be a correct verdict. Results may de-
pend on how one looks at things, and the law may not specify with sufficient clarity the per-
spective iµ which the evidence should be placed. Where the parties' honest and capable 
experts can disagree about the implications of the evidence perhaps a legal fact-finder should 
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Second, jury trials may be better organized than bench trials, and 
are likely to be better structured for appeal. As Judge Higginbotham 
has observed, the need to try a case to a jury imposes a certain order 
on the proceedings. 63 In a jury trial, counsel cannot casually decide 
how to present their evidence, and the judge must explicitly consider _ 
what is and is not allowed. Furthermore, a jury trial creates an ur-
gency about deadlines that may be absent when a judge sits alone, 
and there is strong pressure to minimize interruptions in the presen-
tation of evidence to a jury. While an efficient and energetic judge 
might be able to accomplish more in less time if unconstrained by a 
jury, judges who are not outstanding in these respects may benefit 
from the discipline that a jury imposes. It is, for example, unlikely 
that either the counsel or the judge in the IBM case, which threatens 
to become a modem Jamdyce v. Jamdyce, would have allowed the 
matter to proceed as it has if trial had been to a jury.64 The organi-
zation which jury trial forces on a court is also important on appeal. 
Specific decisions on the admissibility of evidence and on the choice 
of instructions emphasize the parties' theories of the case and what 
the judge sees as relevant. The mode of presenting evidence and the 
initial and final arguments - which may be waived or condensed in 
a bench trial - indicate to an appellate court exactly what the par-
ties saw as central in the case. 
Although it might appear that an irrational verdict from the 
bench, which must be justified with an opinion, is more likely to be 
reversed on appeal than an irrational jury verdict, which is simply a 
pronouncemeQ.t, 65 the procedural difference does not necessarily 
mean that judicial fact-finding is more closely policed on appeal. In 
not be criticized no matter what verdict is reached. As in other areas of law, the fact that a 
dispute is concluded may be more important than the kind of verdict rendered. Indeed, for 
some purposes the law may be as well served by decisions that are relatively random in close 
cases as it is by verdicts that are consistently correct When a number of corporations in a 
given time period have possibly, but not certainly, violated the antitrust laws, it may be impor-
tant from the point of view of national policy that some pay damages, but it may be unimpor-
tant which defendants pay. It does, of course, violate important rights of the litigants if 
burdens are allocated unfairly, but in some complex cases neither plaintiff's nor defendant's 
verdicts will be necessarily or obviously unfair. In a civil case, we should value equally the 
plaintiff's right to recover for a wrong actually done and the defendant's right not to pay for a 
wrong not done. 
63. Higginbotham, supra note 3, at 54. 
64. The case, United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., N.69 Civ. 200 
(S.D.N.Y.), was filed in the last hours of the Johnson Administration. It proceeded through 
the Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations. As I write, eight months into the Reagan Ad-
ministration, the trial has been completed, but a decision has yet to be rendered. 
65. Special verdict procedures may allow considerable insight into how juries responded to 
particular issues raised in a case. See FED. R. CIV. P. 49. See generally Comment, Special 
Verdicts: Rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 YALE L.J. 483 (1965). 
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theory, if the decision is obviously contrary to the weight of the evi-
dence, either fact-finder should be reversed. In fact, appellate judges 
might be more reluctant to reverse fellow judges for irrationality 
than they are to reverse juries. If the verdict appears mistaken to the 
appellate court but is not clearly unreasonable, the court may be able 
to discern a mistake in the instructions or the evidentiary rulings that 
can explain the jury's apparent error. Moreover, if the court feels 
strongly that a new trial is in order, the record is almost certain to 
contain technical errors that will justify a remand. Where a trial has 
been to the bench and the trial judge has been careful not to make an 
error of law in the opinion explaining his verdict, it will be more 
difficult to find grounds for reversing a decision that appears unjust 
but is not clearly irrational. 66 Appellate courts indulge in the pre-
sumption that trial judges disregard inadmissible evidence, and a ca-
gey trial judge seeking to avoid reversal can write an opinion that 
not only disguises the real reasons for his decision, but also asserts 
the irrelevance of all potentially inadmissible evidence and relies in 
part on factors like demeanor which the appellate court cannot 
check. Such tactics are more likely, the more self-consciously polit-
ical the judge's decision. 
A third reason to prefer jury trials is that bench trials can facili-
tate the denial of due process in at least two ways. First, parties have 
a right to have their case judged only on the basis of admissible evi-
dence. Judges who must hear evidence to pass on its admissibility 
may, consciously or unconsciously, be influenced by material that 
would not reach a jury. More importantly, some judges attempt to 
persuade parties to forgo their due process right to a trial in favor of 
settlement. Such efforts may extend to sketching the parameters of 
what the judge sees as a fair resolution of the conflict. Litigants may 
find it quite difficult to assert their right to a trial in the face of judi-
cial pres~ure to settle. This pressure naturally increases when one 
66. It is, however, the case that the "clearly erroneous" standard for reversing the decision 
ofa trial judge is more lenient than the standard that is used in reviewingjury verdicts. Also, 
in complex litigation an appellate court may hesitate to order a new trial when it believes the 
action below was decided incorrectly, although it would not hesitate if it could substitute its 
judgment for that of the fact-finder below. When the trial has been to the judge, the appellate 
court is more likely to be in a position where they can reverse by substituting judgment rather 
than by ordering a new trial. These considerations argue against the point made in the text. 
However, the factors that make for the greater reversibility of bench trials are less likely to 
come into play the more carefully the trial judge justifies the decision. Careful justification is 
most likely where the trial judge has a strong value commitment to the side his verdict favors. 
The question of whether appellate reversal to avoid injustice is more likely in bench or jury 
trials is ultimately empirical. My allocation of arguments to text and footnote reflects my 
judgment of what research would be likely to find. 
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realizes that, should he insist on his right to trial, the judge who is 
encouraging settlement will be the fact-finder. 
Finally, if neither judges nor juries could reach rational judg-
ments in complex litigation, we might prefer the jury because ran-
dom error in such cases is more desirable than systematic error. A 
fact-finder, befuddled by complexity, is likely either to fail to reach a 
verdict ( an option not open to the judge) or to reach a verdict that 
reflects presuppositions and prejudices. Unless there are strong com-
munal values that appear relevant, the bias that dominates in juries 
is likely to differ from case to case. Over a series of cases political 
biases should cancel out. Judges, however, are chosen in part be-
cause of political biases. Should one political party manage, over a 
period of years, to appoint a substantial proportion of the lower fed-
eral bench, decisions in cases too complicated for decision-makers to 
understand may tend to follow the appointing party's line. The re-
sulting pattern of decisions will suggest that fact-finding has been 
subordinated to politics, when in fact it is simply the result of the 
way that values affect decisions when evidence does not dominate. 
Under the hypothesis of complete confusion, trying cases to juries 
would also not avoid decisions dominated by values, but the judicial 
system would not be as discredited since the verdicts would not re-
flect a consistent political preference. 67 
The supposition with which the preceding discussion begins -
that judges and juries are likely to be equally skilled or inept at de-
ciding complicated cases - is not likely to be true. Some judges 
may invariably be more able than juries when cases are complex, 68 
others may invariably be less able, and still others may be more or 
less able depending on the case. Further research may demonstrate 
that using a jury in complex cases is a minimax solution to the 
problems that such cases pose - not as efficient or as rational as trial 
to the better judges, but never sinking to the levels of inefficiency, 
irrationality, or bias that characterize the worst of the bench. 
Whatever research may show, the essential point is that it must be 
comparative. Both jury and judge must be subject to scrutiny. 
67. For purposes such as deterrence, random verdicts might be almost as useful as accurate 
ones so long as the proportion of plaintiffs' verdicts was close to the proportion of plaintiffs 
who deserved to win. Systematic error would necessarily over- or underdeter. The potential 
harm would depend on the mix of deserving parties and on the direction of bias. If the mix of 
deserving parties were highly skewed, and fact-finder bias were in the direction of the skewing, 
systematic error might be preferable to random mistakes. 
68. Note that this would not justify striking a jury if one accepts the analysis I offer. To 
strike a jury, not only must the judge be better able than the jury to decide rationally, but there 
must also be a substantial probability that the jury will be unable to decide the matter 
rationally. 
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The second proviso of Proposition Four concerns reforms that 
might improve the jury's ability to deal with complex cases. If pro-
cedural changes can eliminate the potential conflict between the sev-
enth and fifth amendments without infringing on other rights of the 
parties, there is no good reason why reform should not be preferred 
to choosing between those provisions. Indeed, if the conflict can be 
resolved only by infringing on other rights of the parties, the appro-
priate analysis should consider all of the rights involved. If A's sev-
enth amendment right to a jury trial conflicts with B's fifth 
amendment right to a fair hearing, there may be good reason to deny 
A his right to a jury trial. But if B's due process interest in a fair 
hearing can be accommodated by action that preserves A's right to 
jury trial at the cost of some other of B's rights, the appropriate com-
parison is between A's right to jury trial and B's other right. B 
should not be allowed to insist that denial of jury trial be preferred 
to a possible reform unless the right that B would sacrifice to reform 
is more substantial than A's seventh amendment right. 
In contemplating potential changes in the way that we try com-
plex cases there are, of course, other issues than those that concern 
the parties' rights. On the one hand, detriments may be associated 
with reform. Social costs such as the burdens placed on the judicial 
system may be so great that particular reforms are not feasible. The 
burdens placed on jurors may be similarly intolerable.69 Finally, if 
reforms vitiate values that the right to jury trial was intended to pro-
mote, they will be to some extent self-defeating. On the other hand, 
some innovations might improve the quality of judicial as well as 
jury decisions, and others may aid the jury in simple cases as well as 
complex ones. Such reforms should be explored no matter how the 
fundamental constitutional issue is resolved. 
The last of Proposition Four's three qualifiers restates the teach-
ing of Ross. The right to jury trial turns on characteristics of issues 
and not on characteristics of cases. The corollary to this is that the 
fifth amendment's due process clause overrules the seventh amend-
ment right only when the facts surrounding a particular issue are so 
complex that a jury cannot render a rational judgment on that issue. 
In an antitrust case, for example, the technical difficulty of determin-
ing the relevant product market may justify taking that issue from 
the jury. But once the judge defines the market, the jury may be 
quite capable of determining whether there was an attempt to mo-
69. When the seventh amendment was adopted, trials rarely lasted longer than a day. 
Query whether the framers would have been willing to impose an obligation of attendance in 
court for six to twelve months upon the citizens. 
November 1981) Juries in Complex Cases 97 
nopolize the market and, if so, what damages are attributable to the 
attempt.70 
Separating issues in this way - should it tum out that this is 
required by due process - might substantially simplify the jury's 
task. It could also shorten the period of required jury service since 
the jurors would not have to hear evidence that bears only on mat-
ters taken from them. In some cases, however, so much of the evi-
dence will relate to both court and jury issues that little will be 
gained by severing the evidence. In these circumstances, the jury 
might hear the entire case and render an advisory verdict on the is-
sues that have been committed to the judge. If the jury agrees with 
the trial judge, both the judge and the appellate courts can be more 
confident of his decision. If the jury disagrees with the judge's hold-
ing, the judge has reason to reconsider his decision. In the latter 
instance, the judge should also take particular care to justify the re-
sult that he reached since the disagreement will alert the appellate 
court to a possible error below.71 
Ill. RESEARCH STRATEGIES 
Propositions One, Two, and Three suggest that courts should ap-
proach the question of whether a right to jury trial exists in complex 
legal actions with a strong presumption favoring that right. The sev-
enth amendment and the values that its drafters sought to promote 
require at least that much deference. Proposition Four suggests that 
deference to the seventh amendment does not ultimately resolve the 
jury trial issue. The ultimate decision should reflect the answers to a 
series of empirical questions: Can the jury deal rationally with the 
issues that arise in complex litigation? Can a judge deal rationally 
with these issues? Can the system of litigating complex cases be 
changed to increase the probability of rational verdicts? If we can 
bring only hunches and intuitions to bear on these questions the sev-
enth amendment's clear command should prevail. But the possibil-
ity that juries are befuddled by complex cases is real enough, the 
argument that judges can deal rationally with material that confuses 
70. See Jorde, supra note 3, at 76. 
71. Indeed, the advisory verdict may prove so desirable that courts might want to forgo 
those economies that are available when an issue is withdrawn from a jury and seek advisory 
verdicts on all matters that are thought too complex for lay decision-making. Were this done, 
we could develop some excellent empirical information on whether there are indeed issues in 
complex civil litigation that exceed the jury's capacity for rational decision-making. A poten-
tial difficulty with this approach is that charging juries with respect to matters on which their 
judgment would only be advisory would make their task more difficult and might cause confu-
sion when they deliberate on matters over which they have the final say. 
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jurors is plausible enough, and the due process interests of affected 
litigants are important enough to justify a serious effort to replace 
intuitions with sound empirical evidence. 
Accumulating a body of empirical evidence of sufficient quality 
to justify judicial reliance will not be easy, but there are ways to shed 
light on the relevant issues. In Part IV of this paper, I shall suggest a 
number of possible reforms and discuss ways to evaluate their ef-
fects. In this Part, I discuss what appear to be the most promising 
general techniques of evaluation. 
Four strategies can help resolve the relevant empirical questions. 
The first and most basic relies on the records of completed cases. 
Researchers can read these records to ascertain the kinds of evidence 
presented in complex cases and to understand why complex litiga-
tion often requires months of trial time. Familiarity with existing 
records will be most important in exploring ways to simplify trials, 
but it will aid in answering other questions as well. It is also needed 
for the intelligent implementation of other strategies. Major obsta-
cles to working with records include acquiring them and finding re-
searchers able to evaluate the material intelligently. For many 
purposes, subjective judgments must be made. Whatever the pur-
pose, steps should be taken to ensure that such judgments are relia-
ble - ie., that material will be judged similarly by different 
observers. This means that much of the material must be read by at 
least two persons. 
A second strategy involves interviewing judges and jurors. This 
will be most helpful in exploring the comprehension problems posed 
by complex litigation and in understanding the kinds of evidence 
that different fact-finders think crucial. Securing the cooperation of 
fact-finders, however, may prove difficult. Judges are known to be 
reluctant to sit for lengthy interviews, and this reluctance may be 
exacerbated when the interviews are designed in part to evaluate ju-
dicial competence. Jurors will probably be more willing to be ques-
tioned, but interviews with individual jurors will not allow the 
crucial comparison, which is between the understanding of the judge 
and the understanding of the jurors as a group. Interviews with the 
jurors as a group may be difficult to arrange. Not only is it hard to 
find a time when several unrelated individuals can get together, but 
also crucial jury members may be unwilling to participate. The most 
competent may also be the busiest, and so may be unwilling to allo-
cate further time for research, while dissenters, who often contribute 
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disproportionately to group discussions,72 may have found the expe-
rience unpleasant enough that they are unwilling to relive it, even in 
the interests of science. 
Substantial memory problems may also confound the interview 
strategy. Once the trial has ended, both the judge and the jurors may 
either forget crucial information or distort information to make it 
more congruent with the verdict rendered. Such failures of memory 
may not have affected the decision, for they may have occurred only 
after a verdict was returned. Indeed, the seriousness of the actual 
task may have led the fact-finders to resort to notes, transcripts, and 
other memory aids that will not be used in later interviews. This 
memory problem means that interviews concerning less recent cases 
may be useful only to learn such gross information as whether the 
judge agreed with the jury's verdict or which jurors were the most 
influential. Researchers should, therefore, plan interviews while 
cases are being tried, and conduct them at the earliest opportunity. 
A third technique that might prove valuable is the use of shadow 
juries. Shadow juries consist of people eligible for jury duty who 
attend the trial at the request of an experimenter rather than of the 
court.73 If the judge cooperates, the shadow jurors can be treated 
very much like actual jurors - sitting in a special location and leav-
ing the courtroom whenever the actual jury is excused. Because 
shadow jurors can be interviewed either individually or in a group at 
any time, and can be asked to deliberate on specific matters when the 
trial has recessed, the technique is an especially promising way to 
research the problems posed by different aspects of a complex case. 
The extent to which shadow juries mimic the dynamics of actual 
juries is affected to an unknown degree by the fact that shadow ju-
rors know that nothing turns on their verdict. This poses special 
problems when trials are long and complex since responsibility may 
be an incentive to pay attention. If so, differences between actual 
and shadow juries may become greater and greater as trials progress. 
Shadow juries may also be affected by the monitoring process. Re-
searchers can learn most from the shadow jury by interviewing the 
jurors throughout the case and by observing periodic deliberations. 
But the more closely shadow jurors are monitored, the more their 
72. C. Hawkins, Interaction and Coalition Realignment in Consensus-Seeking Groups: A 
Study of Experimental Jury Deliberations (August 17, 1960) (unpublished doctoral disserta-
tion in University of Chicago Library). 
73. See, e.g., s. McCABE & R. PuRVES, THE SHADOW JURY AT WORK 2 (Oxford Univer-
sity Penal Research Unit Occasional Paper No. 8) (1974); Zeisel & Diamond, The Effect of 
Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal .District Court, 30 
STAN. L. REv. 491, 492 (1978). 
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experience will diverge from that of the actual jurors, and the less 
confident we can be when generalizing from a shadow jury to the 
jury responsible for a case. 
However, in many complex trials a shadow jury will be available 
that does not have these deficiencies. Because jurors may become 
unavailable during the course of a lengthy trial, judges hearing com-
plex cases may seat as many as six alternate jurors. 74 These jurors 
listen to the entire trial knowing that they might have to decide the 
case. They are in fact actual jurors. If, after a case goes to the jury, 
excused alternates form a group to deliberate, researchers monitor-
ing their deliberations could gain a unique insight into the capabili-
ties of ordinary jurors. If the deliberations of alternate jurors and 
their responses to postverdict questioning were similar to those of 
shadow jurors who had been monitored throughout, there would be 
good reason to believe that the study of shadow juries allows sub-
stantial insight into the workings of the jury system. 
A variant on the shadow jury, which to my knowledge has never 
been tried, is the shadow judge. Researchers could pay retired 
judges or practicing lawyers to observe complex litigation and evalu-
ate their ability to comprehend the evidence and the legal issues 
presented. There are obvious drawbacks. Retired judges may be 
less alert than active judges, and lawyers who could be paid enough 
to forsake their practice for social research are not likely to typify the 
class of lawyers that ascends the federal bench. Nevertheless, the 
study of shadow judges may provide some interesting insights into 
the differences between both professional and lay fact-finding and 
individual and group decision-making. 
The fourth research strategy is simulation, ordinarily an excellent 
way to study jury processes.75 In a good simulation, the researcher 
develops a credible videotape of a trial, recruits subjects more or less 
at random from the juror population, and manipulates variables 
with precision. For example, one can study the effects of different 
decision rules by instructing some mock juries to reach unanimous 
verdicts and telling others, which witnessed the same taped trial, to 
reach 9-3 decisions. Or one can measure the utility of limiting in-
structions by confronting some mock juries with inadmissible evi-
dence followed by an instruction to disregard and others with the 
same evidence but no instructions. For all practical purposes, how-
74. FED. R. CIV. P. 47(b). 
15. See, e.g., R. lIAsTIE, s. PENROD, & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY (in press); M. 
SAKS, JURY VERDICTS (1977); R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 34-42 
(1967); Hawkins, supra note 72. 
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ever, realistic simulation is impossible if realism requires evidence so 
voluminous that it takes months to present. Both the production cost 
of the required tape and the cost of acquiring subjects are likely to be 
prohibitive.76 These difficulties mean that simulations are not a 
promising tool when trial length is the variable of interest. However, 
complex litigation poses problems that are not inextricably. linked 
with trial length or voluminous evidence. Simulations are a way of 
exploring such problems. For example, simulation techniques can 
be used to measure comprehension of current instructions and to 
suggest possible revisions, to develop understandable ways of 
presenting expert testimony, and to compare the intelligibility of oral 
testimony, depositions read by lawyers, and depositions that jurors 
read on their own. 
The methods that I have briefly outlined _provide ways of learn-
ing about the characteristics of complex cases and about how jurors 
and judges deal with them. The techniques are not mutually exclu-
sive. Each type of research may be done well or poorly, but there are 
no fixed standards of quality that must be reached before we can 
learn from them. What we learn depends not only on the rigor of 
the research, but also on the problem to be illuminated. Indeed, at 
this point we know so little about juries and complex cases that sim-
ple observation has much to offer. We may also learn from the un-
controlled innovations that lawyers sometimes call "experiments." 
For example, if in an effort to increase the average educational at-
tainment of juries seated in complex cases, a court were to increase 
its jury fees to $100 a day, a pattern might develop that was so strik-
ingly different from previous patterns of jury service that we could 
with some confidence attribute it to the higher fee. 
Courts should be encouraged to try promising innovations. They 
should also be encouraged to build arrangements for systematic 
monitoring into their planned change. Without systematic monitor-
ing, we are likely to miss much. For example, a judge who notes that 
the average education of seated juries went up after jury fees were 
raised in his lcourtroom is much less informative than a researcher 
who reports that in the twenty juries seated before the fees were 
raised the average educational attainment was 11.9 years, while in the 
twenty juries seated after the change average educational attainment 
76. Paying shadow jurors is also expensive, but simulations typically require many more 
subjects because the core concern is to measure effects associated with different states of an 
independent variable. To be statistically reliable, such effects must be measured over rela-
tively large numbers of subjects. The problems and costs of securing subjects are compounded 
when one is interested in the behavior of groups because each group will count as only one 
subject for some purposes of statistical analysis. 
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was 13.2 years. Furthermore, involving researchers in planning for 
innovation may lead to better conceived innovations and may allow 
some innovations to be instituted as true experiments which would 
dramatically increase our ability to pinpoint precise effects.77 
Before investigating specific ways in which the trial of complex 
cases can be improved, one should determine whether there is a seri-
ous problem of jury comprehension in such cases and, if so, the exact 
dimensions of the problem. We can illustrate the potential utility of 
the four techniques identified above by showing how they might be 
used to illuminate this issue. A concrete example also illustrates po-
tential shortcomings. 
An investigation into jury competence should start by question-
ing judges who have sat in complex cases to determine the incidence 
and directionality of judge-jury disagreement. A low level of disa-
greement would suggest that parties in complex cases are not being 
greatly helped or seriously disadvantaged by jury trial. However, 
one should be wary about reading too much into such evidence. We 
have probably not had a sufficient number of complex jury trials to 
allow reliable statistical generalizations about the incidence of disa-
greement between judges and juries. Furthermore, a judge's recol-
lections may be colored by the verdict returned. In particular, a 
judge who thought the case close might report agreement with any 
jury verdict. It would be far better to have judges report their opin-
ions during the jury's deliberations, but the scarcity of ongoing com-
plex cases means that evidence from sitting judges would be 
essentially anecdotal. 
Judicial evaluations of jury performance may be supplemented 
by the judgments that experts reach after studying transcript mate-
rial. If independent experts agree on the appropriate verdicts in par-
ticular cases and if their judgments are similar to the jury verdicts, 
there is good reason to believe that the losing party was not unconsti-
tutionally disadvantaged by jury trial even though we cannot know 
how the jury reached its verdict. Again, however, the small number 
of complex cases may preclude statistically reliable generalization. 
One way ~o cope with this problem is to examine cases of gradually 
increasing length and complexity. Jury disagreement with judges 
and experts may increase as the degree of complexity or the length of 
the trials increases. If so, there is some reason to believe that com-
plexity interferes with the jury's capacity for rational judgment. If 
there is no,such corresponding increase, there is less reason to attri-
11. See Campbell, Reforms as Experiments, 24 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 409 (1969). 
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bute disagreements to the complexity of cases, whatever the overall 
level of agreement. For this reason, information on cases that vary 
in complexity is particularly important if the jury often disagrees 
with either the judge or the experts. 
A number of problems inhere in using rates of judge-jury agree-
ment to assess jury competence.78 One is that if gross measures are 
used substantial agreement may be expected by chance alone.79 A 
second difficulty is that gross measures are insensitive to differences 
in cases. For example, the jury might be capable of dealing ration-
ally with complex cases when the evidence clearly favors one side 
and strikes no emotional chord but not when a case is close or when 
passions are raised. If the vast majority of the cases examined are 
clear and unemotional there may be substantial judge-jury agree-
ment, but the agreement may be confined to cases where little would 
be lost by giving the matter to a judge since any fact-finder would 
reach the same result. Disagreement in the rare close case, which 
might reflect confusion in the face of complexity, would be sub-
merged in the overall rate of agreement. A third problem with as-
sessing jury competence by rates of judge-jury agreement is the 
tendency to treat the judge's opinion as the "correct" one, and to 
regard contrary jury verdicts as deviations from a norm. 80 Yet it is 
not obvious that the judge's decision will be nearer the ideal than the 
jury's. Group discussion, for example, can nullify the biases that 
may dominate individual judgments and enables groups to perform 
better than individuals who are more competent than any one mem-
ber of the group.81 
Using expert evaluation is a more promising way of deciding 
whether the jury's. judgment is defensible, but it too has its limita-
tions. Experts often have biases that can affect their readings of the 
facts. Strong differences of opinion seem particularly prevalent 
among economists, who are the appropriate professionals to evaluate 
the antitrust cases that have provided the primary battleground for 
78. The first two problems that follow may also confound expert-jury or judge-expert 
comparisons. 
79. If both judge and jury failed to understand the evidence and instead decided ran-
domly, one would expect agreement on half the cases. If one or both fact-finders misunder-
stands in a systematic way or responds to irrelevant aspects of the case the expected level of 
agreement- assuming no rational processing of relevant information - would depend on the 
kinds of errors to which each fact-finder is susceptible and the mix of cases. 
80. KAI.VEN & ZEISEL, supra note 37. Cf. J. BALDWIN & M. MCCONVILLE, JURY TRIALS 
(1979). For a discussion of this and other problems with the research of Baldwin and McCon-
ville, see Hastie, Judgment Non Obstantibus Dalis, 19 MICH. L. REv. 728 (1981). 
81. See Kaplan & Miller, Reducing the Effects of Juror Bias, 36 J. PER. & Soc. PSYCH. 
1443 (1978). See generally Haft, supra note 59; Lempert, supra note 10. 
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those contesting the right to jury trial. Indeed, finding "neutral" 
economists may be so difficult that one must demand a consensus 
among economists identified with different schools of thought before 
treating expert judgments as normative. In cases where it proves im-
possible to develop a consensus, it would be difficult to conclude that 
juries had acted irrationally. A second drawback to the use of expert 
judgments is that they might be based largely on information known 
to the expert but never introduced into evidence or never properly 
communicated to the jury. A party cannot complain that jury irra-
tionality produced a mistaken verdict if the verdict results from his 
failure to present evidence rather than the jury's failure to consider 
rationally what was presented. 
Where both judge and expert disagree with a jury's verdict there 
is, of course, ·considerable reason to believe that the verdict resulted 
from the jury's failure to understand the evidence. But if judges 
share experts' biases or are similarly susceptible to the influence of 
nonrecord information, one might expect that where judge and jury 
disagree experts will more often take the side of the judge regardless 
of what is rational. Furthermore, disagreements may reflect value 
judgments that are properly made by the jury in close cases. 82 
Thus, while measures of judge-jury or judge-expert-jury agree-
ment are a first step in determining whether juries can deal rationally 
with complex cases, an adequate judgment on this point depends on 
insight into decision-making processes. Interviews are a potential 
source of insight. Jurors and judges can be asked to identify the im-
portant issues and the crucial evidence in the cases they heard. Their 
judgments can be compared with the judgments of experts familiar 
with the case and with the judgments of the lawyers involved. In 
addition, interviews can probe understandings of specific issues and 
identify ways in which conflicts in the evidence have been resolved. 
Difficulties with the interview approach have already been men-
tioned. First, because of the difficulty of securing cooperation from 
judges, it may be that only jurors are interviewed. If this occurs, the 
temptation will be to contrast juror responses with an ideal of full 
understanding rather than with the level of understanding that the 
judge would in fact have achieved. Second, jurors are likely to be 
interviewed individually, thus underestimating the wisdom and ra-
tionality iliat can emerge from group discussion. Third, memory 
82. KAI.VEN & ZEISEL, supra note 37, at 104-449, thoroughly explore the sources ofjudge-
jury disagreement in criminal cases. Often the source of disagreement is the different values 
that judges and jurors bring to cases. Value differences are most important when cases are 
close. ·· 
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problems will be severe unless the interviews occur immediately af-
ter trials have concluded, and even immediate interviews may un-
derestimate the capacity of memory that is aided by exhibits, notes, 
and the special incentives that responsibility for an important deci-
sion may bring. Finally, there can be several routes to a rational 
decision. The jury or judge may fare poorly by the route that the 
interviewer wishes to explore, but the actual verdict may have re-
sulted from an equally rational way of approaching the evidence and 
evaluating the legal issues. 
The above difficulties are less substantial when interviews are 
used to probe the processes by which individuals or groups reach 
decisions. Judges may be requested to lay out their decision-making 
strategies. For example, it would be interesting to learn how a judge 
decided which exhibits to review and what transcript material to 
read as he pondered his decision. Jurors may be asked how their 
juries functioned, whether and how labor was divided, who the most 
influential members were, what impasses developed, and how they 
were resolved. If in a particular case we learn that the jurors seri-
ously examined the issues at the core, their decision-making process 
was probably sufficiently rational to comport with due process no 
matter what their verdict. But if the jurors report that the instruc-
tions were perceived as meaningless or that crucial expert testimony 
was ignored because no one could understand it, the right to jury 
trial in complex cases would be properly vulnerable. 83 
Monitoring shadow jurors on a day-to-day basis also allows re-
searchers to determine what tends to be understood or misunder-
stood. If the shadow jurors or some subset of them are allowed to 
deliberate, the likelihood that group discussion will clear up misun-
derstanding can also be evaluated. Daily monitoring is important 
because a juror's understanding of evidence offered at the beginning 
of complex cases may not be retrievable by interviews at the end. 
Yet early understanding may color the way in which subsequent in-
formation is processed. Although the final gestalt is not equal to the 
sum of its parts, if jurors or judges systematically misunderstand evi-
dence as it is presented, there is a good chance that the final verdict 
will reflect that misunderstanding. 
Simulations allow a more precise test of how jurors comprehend 
different kinds of evidence. One might, for example, recreate the 
expert testimony given in an actual case and present it to a variety of 
potential jurors. The number of subjects who may be exposed to the 
83. One would still want to know how judges utilized the instructions and testimony. 
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testimony makes it possible to reach statistically reliable conclusions 
about such things as the difference between group and individual 
judgments or the relative comprehension of well-educated and less 
well-educated decision-makers. The problem, of course, is to know 
exactly what to make of "reliable" results, for the import of the dif-
ferences between a simulated portion of a trial and the same evi-
dence presented in the context of an actual case is unclear. But if 
simulations reveal considerable misunderstanding that is not amelio-
rated by deliberations, there is good reason to believe that actual 
juries will be confused. Conversely, if mock jurors can comprehend 
technical evidence, actual jurors would probably understand similar 
evidence although it was offered in a lengthy case. 
No one approach to the question of whether juries can deal ra-
tionally with complex cases is ~ely to yield results sufficient to over-
come the presumption that jury trials are constitutionally required in 
complex cases or, conversely, to quiet all doubts about the ability of 
juries to rationally decide the issues that such cases pose. If research 
from a variety of perspectives consistently supports the hypothesis of 
jury rationality, the Supreme Court will have good reason to hold 
that due process rights are not adversely affected by jury trials in 
complex cases. But if methodologically different studies converge on 
the conclusion that juries, unlike judges, cannot deal rationally with 
the evidence in complex cases, the Court must consider changing the 
ways that complex cases are conducted or creating a right to a bench 
trial. 
Of course, decent empirical research need not yield unequivocal 
policy implications. Instead of learning that juries are either compe-
tent or incompetent when faced with complexity, we may learn that 
they appear to do some things well and other things poorly. We are 
also likely to hear of certain cases in which juries performed su-
perbly and others in which their verdicts were untenable. Observing 
that juries sometimes perform well and sometimes do not suggests 
that there are ways to improve the jury system. Natural variation 
should not be cursed for its tendency to frustrate empirically based 
policy analysis but should instead be seized upon for the opportunity 
that it offers. 
IV. IMPROVING JURY PERFORMANCE 
To improve the jury's capacity to deal with complex cases, one 
must first identify those features of complex litigation that are associ-
ated with poor jury performance. Cases in which juries are reputed 
to have performed well or poorly provide a possible starting point. 
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Looking at such cases may reveal differences that provide intuitively 
plausible explanations for variations in performance. One possibil-
ity is jury composition. Research might disclose, for example, that 
the better juries had more college-educated jurors or fewer retirees. 
Jury management techniques may also be important. Judges have 
considerable discretion in conducting jury trials. Among the possi-
ble variations are to allow note taking, furnish jurors with daily tran-
scripts, instruct on the law before evidence is received, allow counsel 
to sum up when testimony on a particular issue is concluded, and 
submit written instructions to the jury at the close of the case. Case 
structure is another crucial variable, for some kinds of complexity 
may cause greater problems than others. For example, the joinder of 
numerous claims, any one of which is not particularly complicated, 
may tax the jury's ability more or less than resolving a single highly 
technical issue. And juries may handle some issues - like damage 
questions - well, but other issues - like questions of market struc-
ture - poorly. Furthermore, the relative incidence of documents 
and testimonial evidence might systematically affect the jury's ability 
to comprehend, and the sheer length of trial can deleteriously affect 
reasoned decision-making. Finally, differences in jury performance 
may be traced to the ways that lawyers present their arguments. For 
example, a lawyer in an antitrust case with a solid argument from 
economic theory and a possible appeal to local prejudice may think 
the appeal to prejudice more promising than technical analysis and 
expert witnesses. In these circumstances, a verdict for the opponent 
may be rational even if the lawyer's technical argument is sound.84 
Another lawyer may attempt to confuse a jury or overwhelm it with 
irrelevant evidence. If a judge allows the lawyer to use such tactics 
and the jury is misled, the lawyer and judge are as responsible as the 
jury system for the irrational outcome. _ 
Because we have some idea of the problems complex cases pose 
for jurors, we can suggest procedural changes that might improve 
jury performance. As we shall see, some promising innovations can 
be ordered by judges under existing authority, others require statu-
tory authorization, and a few might pose constitutional problems. 
Many of these involve little additional expense to the parties, and 
some might save money. To the extent that innovations are designed 
to preserve the seventh amendment right to jury trial, there is one 
constraint: the basic features of the jury system must be retained. 
84. Jurors who realize that a lawyer is attempting to arouse their prejudices might sensibly 
conclude that the lawyer does not believe his case sound, and might decide to trust that law-
yer's judgment of the quality of his case more than their own judgment -
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Some otherwise promising changes may be problematic in this re-
gard. The discussion that follows reviews a number of possible re-
forms, noting some of the problems that they pose and the kinds of 
research that would be relevant to their evaluation. 85 
A. Restructuring Cases 
Complex cases are problematic for the legal system because they 
tend to involve lengthy trials, multitudes of issues, numerous parties, 
technical evidence, and difficult questions of law. Reducing the 
length and complexity of trials is likely to increase the quality of 
fact-finding in both bench and jury trials. Reforms designed to do 
this should be explored even if judges and juries are currently meet-
ing the minimum standards of constitutionally adequate per-
formance. 
One technique for reducing complexity is to limit the amount of 
evidence that the parties can present. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence authorizes judges to do this by excluding evidence that 
is cumulative or that promises to be excessively confusing or prejudi-
cial. 86 Although judges no doubt have appropriate occasions on 
which to exercise their authority under rule 403, relying on this rule 
to attack the problem of complexity offers only limited prospects for 
improvement. Confusion or prejudice are excessive under rule 403 
only if they substantially outweigh the probative value of the evi-
dence. Probative value, however, typically depends on the shape of 
the case to come, and the more complicated the case the more diffi-
cult the task of anticipating what future evidence will show. Even 
redundant evidence is not necessarily cumulative, if by cumulative 
we mean evidence that has no additional probative value. As long as 
the source of the earlier evidence was not completely credible and 
fully understood, redundant evidence may enhance rational fact-
:finding. 87 Thus, judges exercising discretion under rule 403 invite 
85. Insight into factors that distinguish juries of greater and lesser competence may be 
tested by simulation and other means. Information gleaned from the study of completed cases 
may also be communicated to the bench through speeches, articles, and the like. Judges who 
draw on such wisdom should do so in a systematic fashion. Innovations should be carefully 
specified and procedures for monitoring their effects should be in place before they are at-
tempted. Districts that regularly handle complex cases would be well-advised if they had so-
cial scientists on their staff to monitor the apparent effects of various innovations and suggest 
revisions where appropriate. Ideally, innovation would be instituted in an experimental fash-
ion. See Campbell, supra note 77. 
86. FED. R. Evm. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence." 
87. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 15 MICH. L. REv. 1021, 1096 (1977). 
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reversible error and risk inappropriately harming the case of one or 
both of the parties. 
A better way of proceeding is to let the parties present whatever 
otherwise admissible evidence they wish as long as they do not ex-
ceed specified time limits. 88 If the overall time limits provide the 
parties with a fair opportunity to present their case, allowing the par-
ties' attorneys to determine the relative importance of the evidence 
available to them avoids a potential source of reversible error. It 
also forces attorneys to organize their cases in a tight, coherent fash-
ion. The resulting organization may contribute more to the quality 
of the fact-finder's decision by clarifying core conflicts than does the 
sheer shortening of the case. Finally, limiting the length of cases 
may enable the court to seat a more representative and more able 
jury. Not only are people more likely to be available for shorter 
trials than for longer ones, 89 but if the likely termination date of the 
trial is known, people may consent to jury duty who would find some 
way to escape an open-ended commitment.90 
The major drawback to this strategy for reducing complexity lies 
in its potential unfairness to one or both of the parties. If a party 
needs forty days to present the essential evidence in his case and is 
only allotted thirty days, the verdict will not reflect the strength of 
his position. To some extent this problem can be alleviated by al-
lowing extra time to parties who can show that their case requires 
further evidence and that they have not wasted a portion of their 
original allotment.91 If such extensions are not strictly controlled, 
88. This technique has been used. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983, 987-
88 (D. Conn. 1978). 
89. Although trials of a month or two are exceptionally long, in many jurisdictions terms 
of jury service have historically been of this length. Thus, people have often been called upon 
to make themselves available for jury duty over long periods of time. There is of course con-
siderably more flexibility in a two-month jury term than in a two-month trial, since those on 
the venire are not expected to sit continuously throughout the term and particular events that 
prevent jury service for a week or two during the term can be accommodated. Nevertheless, 
some courts have obliged jurors to report for jury duty every day during their term and a 
morning might be lost to such reporting. Furthermore, service on a number of different juries 
during each term was common. Although these patterns are changing with modem systems of 
jury management, it may be that if trials can be confined to two months or less, the effect of 
long trials on the composition of petit juries will not be as severe as is usually imagined. 
90. Jury trial is an obligation, so it might seem that willingness should have little to do with 
service. In practice, those who do not want to serve on specific trials can usually find some 
ways to avoid the obligation. This may be fortunate. Because lengthy complicated trials re-
quire substantial attention over long periods of time, it is probably unwise to coerce participa-
tion in such cases. 
91. There is the additional problem of measuring how the allotment is to be used. Cross-
examination time, for example, should be part of the cross-examiner's case, or else one party 
could use up the other party's time by dilatory tactics. However, the plaintiff will typically not 
cross-examine any of the defense witnesses until bis entire case has been presented. Thus, the 
plaintiff would wish to reserve time from bis case-in-chief for later cross-examination. But this 
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however, the effort to limit the time available to parties would still 
prove fruitless. An even more difficult problem exists if there are 
substantial differences in the time that parties need to present their 
cases. If, for example, the plaintiffs case cannot be fairly presented 
in less than thirty days but an adequate defense requires only fifteen 
days, the plaintiff may be substantially disadvantaged if each side is 
allowed thirty-two days for its case-in-chief. 
The question of whether it is desirable to shorten trials by limit-
ing the time available to the parties can be fruitfully informed by 
empirical research. Since some judges have imposed time limits, one 
can learn how the participants responded to the procedure. The 
views of the attorneys will be particularly interesting. One would 
want to know how their tactics were affected by the time limitations, 
and whether they thought that the limitations affected the verdict. 
Reports that time restrictions neither interfered with case presenta-
tions nor had any obvious effects on verdicts would provide some 
reason to urge the wider adoption of this technique. But such 
favorable responses would not necessarily mean that the technique is 
appropriate in all lengthy cases. Not only do we have too little expe-
rience with such restrictions to allow safe generalization to the range 
of complex cases, but restrictions may have been disproportionately 
imposed in cases where the attorneys were unlikely to have required 
more than the allotted time to present their evidence. 
The feasibility of time restrictions could be further checked by 
looking at cases where the parties were unconstrained by time limits. 
Experienced attorneys could evaluate case records to determine how 
much material might have been eliminated without substantially un-
dercutting the probative force of the parties' positions. While post 
hoc examination is likely to reveal opportunities for condensation 
that would not be obvious to the litigating attorneys, if the opportu-
nities are substantial one may conclude that case-time limitations 
will not necessarily impose burdens that interfere with just decision-
making. Retrospective analysis of this sort can also help determine 
whether case-time limits should be presumptively the same for both 
parties. If, for example, the essence of the defendant's case consist-
ently takes less time to convey than the essence of the plaintiffs, 
gives the defendant an advantage in that he can adjust his cross-examination in light of the 
case-in-chief that he intends to present. The plaintiff can only guess at the optimum balance 
between direct and cross-examination. Possible solutions include not charging cross-examina-
tion time to either party and scheduling additional days to allow for this or charging a fixed 
portion of the cross-examination to the party presenting the witness with additional cross-
examination being the responsibility of the cross-examiner. The latter method would not elim-
inate the defendant's advantage, but might effectively roioiroire it. 
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courts might want to allocate more time to plaintiffs than to 
defendants.92 
In the statistician's ideal world, evidence presented in a court 
case would be a random sample from a normally distributed range 
of facts that centered around the true state of affairs jurors were re-
quired to discern. Trials in this world could be substantially short-
ened because one could begin to estimate, with remarkable 
precision, what the distribution of all facts would look like after the 
first fifty or sixty facts had been introduced. Trial evidence is, of 
course, not drawn randomly from a normal distribution of facts. 
Nevertheless, if the evidence on each issue is ranked from the most 
to the least probative, it may be that the probative impact of evi-
dence drops sharply after the first few facts on an issue are offered. 
If so, even a dramatic curtailment in the length of complex trials 
might not affect the resulting verdicts. This possibility can be tested 
experimentally by having experienced attorneys pick from the 
records of complex cases the evidence that they would present if con-
strained by a three-day time limit, a five-day time limit, an eight-day 
time limit, and so on. These reconstructed records could then be 
given to mock juries instructed to deliberate to decisions. This ex-
periment might show that, after a certain point, both the verdicts 
reached and the general tenor of the deliberations remained more or 
less the same despite the introduction of additional noncumulative 
evidence. If so, there is further reason to believe that little need be 
lost by the imposition of reasonable time limits. 
For symbolic reasons and because degrees of possible curtail-
ment would differ with the closeness of cases, one would not want to 
slash time allocations as drastically as such research might suggest. 
However, if the hypothesized pattern of diminishing returns were 
shown to exist, lawyers might wish to try a "mini" version of their 
case to a jury and use the resulting verdict in settlement negotiations. 
Since such "minitrials" could obviate the need for more protracted 
. I 
proceedings, courts might treat them much like actual cases. Settle-
ment would be further encouraged if, as with certain other schemes 
of pre-trial arbitration,93 the party rejecting the preliminary adjudi-
92. Such allocations should be presumptive only because of their facial inequality. If a 
specific defendant - to continue the example - can demonstrate a need for more time, it . 
should be granted. An alternative, and perhaps a symbolically more acceptable way of pro-
ceeding, is to allocate equal amounts of case-time to the parties but allow each party to seek 
more time. In passing on requests for more time, the judge would bear in mind that studies of 
past cases indicate that - let us hypothesize - it takes plaintiffs, on the average, 20% longer 
than defendants to present their core case. 
93. Wayne County, Michigan, for example, instituted a voluntary mediation program in 
1971 to deal with automobile negligence cases. If a party rejected the mediation board's evalu-
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cation had to pay the opponent's attorneys' fees if the judgment after 
trial was substantially the same as the preliminary one. Unlike other 
schemes, this approach preserves the virtues of jury trial in a non-
binding procedure. 
Case structure may also be simplified by eliminating parties and 
dividing issues. If a case is too complicated for a jury only because 
liberal joinder has allowed the consolidation of related actions, the 
seventh amendment should be read to require severance once there 
is a demand for a jury trial. Because the right to join actions is not 
constitutional in origin it must be subordinated to the right to jury 
trial. Although denying the otherwise permissible joinder of claims 
could increase the costs of litigating all claims, several factors suggest 
that the increase may be smaller than one might imagine. First, the 
necessary reduction in complexity may still allow large numbers of 
cases to be tried together. Presumably, each block of cases would be 
more homogeneous than the original group of joined cases, allowing 
briefer and better focused cases likely to improve the quality of jury 
justice within blocks. Second, if the same jury sat on all blocks of 
cases, evidence presented in earlier blocks would not have to be re-
peated in full. Finally, the severed actions might well be s~ttled on 
the pattern established by the first case or block of cases.94 
A third way of restructuring trials to simplify the jury's task is to 
separate issues for decision. This can be done either by seeking a 
series of separate judgments at the end of the trial or by separating 
the evidence on important issues and receiving verdicts on those sep-
arate issues as the trial progresses. The end-of-the-trial method, 
which can be accomplished either by seeking special verdicts or by 
submitting a general verdict with written interrogatories, does noth-
ing to simplify the trial, but may promote rational verdicts by struc-
turing jury deliberations. Trying issues seriatim involves a 
substantial restructuring of ordinary procedures, but it promises 
great simplification_ since_ juries _would_ consider. only; one issue at 
ation of damages, that party had to pay the actual costs of a subsequent trial unless the results 
were at least 10% more favorable than the mediation board's judgment. WAYNE COUNTY 
(Michigan) Cm. CT. R. 21. 
94. Research on settlement patterns is desirable regardless of its constitutional relevance, 
for even ifjoinder did not threaten to make cases too complex for juries, trials limited to single 
parties and issues or closely related parties and issues would have their advantages. They are 
shorter, less burdensome to the courts and litigants, and, perhaps, more satisfactorily resolved. 
The question is whether these benefits are outweighed by the need for trials in the unjoined 
cases or whether those cases are likely to be settled. Because trials involving only some of a 
number of related causes of action occur today, the information on settlement patterns needed 
to evaluate this tradeoff is currently available. One must also determine the extent to which it 
is the law of collateral estoppel rather than the example of an earlier judgment which accounts 
for settlements along the lines of a previously decided case or group of cases. 
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a time.95 It could also shorten trials since an early decision might · 
foreclose the need for further litigation. 
Trying issues seriatim, however, has an unattractive side. It is 
likely to change the balance of advantage in jury trials, and it pre-
vents the jury from performing some of the functions that the fram-
ers of the seventh amendment sought to preserve. It forces juries to 
decide issues before they have a perspective on the entire case, limits 
the juror's understanding of what is at stake at each decision point, 
and may change the way that evidence is viewed. For example, a 
witness who appears credible when te~tifying on one issue might ap-
pear less reliable if his testimony were not so confined. Moreover, 
this procedure, like all special verdict procedures, systematically dis-
advantages plaintiffs who must prevail on each question to receive 
an overall recovery.96 If the jury reports separately on each issue, 
the problem is even more acute than when special verdicts are re-
quested at the close of a case because jurors contemplating a series of 
special verdicts are more likely to see inconsistencies that will lead 
them to rethink mistaken judgments. 
Separating out issues for decision raises so many serious 
problems that it should be treated as a last resort, appropriate only if 
the jury cannot deal rationally with complex cases or certain issues 
in them and less drastic reforms cannot correct the problem. Even 
then, trying issues seriatim may change the balance of advantage so 
much and destroy so many of the benefits of the jury system that 
bench trials would be preferable. 
A somewhat less drastic reform, but one that is also suspect be-
cause of the inroads that it makes on the jury's prerogatives, is in-
creased reliance on special masters. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure permits courts to refer "complicated" issues in jury 
trials to a master.97 In such cases, a master plays a role somewhat 
like an expert witness, his expertise being his ability to find facts and 
judge their legal implications. Subject to objections upon points of 
95. The extent of simplification would depend on how broadly the trial court chose to 
define each issue. 
96. This may reflect the logic of the law, but if plaintiffs must prevail on each separate 
issue by only a preponderance of the evidence, it may make deserving plaintiffs the victims of 
chance. Suppose that the weight of the evidence on each issue favors the plaintiff and the fact-
finder's judgment centers, within the limits of random error, around the true probability that 
the facts are as the plaintiff claims. As the number of issues that the fact-finder considers 
increases and the the evidence on each issue becomes closer, it becomes likely that chance will 
at some point lead the fact-finder mistakenly to hold for the defendant. Jury dynamics may 
also have this effect. Where a minority has given in on a series of issues, the majority may 
defer to them on a question where the evidence seems close, not realizing that this will destroy 
the plaintiff's entire case. 
97. FED. R. Crv. P. 53. 
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law, the master's report may be read to the jurors, who are then in-
structed that the master's findings upon the issues submitted to him 
are evidence in the case, to be treated like any other evidence. The 
parties may dispute or supplement that report with any admissible 
evid~nce, whether or not it was presented to the master. 
If parties tend to settle on the basis of masters' reports, the use of 
masters under rule 53 serves more to take cases away from juries 
than it does to simplify them or to render verdicts more rational. 
Where the masters' reports do not induce settlement, they may com-
plicate matters, for they are additional evidence for the jury to con-
sider. Since rule 53 provides that "the master shall not be directed to 
report the evidence,"98 the parties must present evidence to effec-
tively contest or support the master's finding. Treating the master's 
report as evidence rather than as a commentary on evidence means 
that it is unlikely to enhance the rationality of the jury's verdict un-
less the master has dealt with the matter more rationally than the 
jury99 and the jury defers to his judgment. 
If the goal of resorting to masters is not to take issues away from 
the jury by encouraging deference to an "expert" but to simplify 
complex trials and promote informed jury judgments, there are bet-
ter ways of using masters than those authorized by rule 53. What 
might be most helpful to the jury is if the master specified exactly 
what evidence had influenced him and what he saw as the crucial 
factual conflicts in the case. The parties could then take exception to 
the master's report just as parties take exceptions to the report of an 
administrative law judge on appeal to the agency. In this way, the 
parties would know the specific aspects of their cases that one fact-
.finder had found most or least convincing and could off er evidence 
that was directly focused on issues that had been identified as cru-
cial. The jury, with some insight into the quality of the master's rea-
soning, could better judge how much deference his conclusions 
deserved. In addition, the need to present evidence might diminish 
substantially. On peripheral matters, the parties might be content to 
adopt the master's factual .findings. On some important issues, they 
might accept the-master's summary of the evidence and dispute only 
the inferences drawn therefrom. 
98. Fed R. Civ. P. 53(3). 
99. This may not reflect relative capacity for rational judgment. The lawyers may present 
evidence to the master in a way that is more conducive to rational evaluation. Here again we 
lack useful information. We could better judge the costs and utility of resorting to masters if 
we knew how frequently master's reports induced settlements, how often juries differed with 
the suggested findings of masters, and in what ways the parties contested and supported the 
findings of masters at trial. 
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Because masters' reports will interfere with parties' abilities to 
structure their own cases and juries might unduly defer to masters' 
judgments, reference to masters should not become the routine reac-
tion to threatened complexity. But if juries cannot respond ration-
ally to the factual conflicts of complex cases, using masters to clarify 
the more difficult issues may avoid due process problems and pre-
serve much that is of value. 
Parties, of course, do not need masters to define what is undis-
puted. Stipulations are a common way of removing factual conflicts 
from cases. Parties in complex cases should be encouraged to admit 
facts or stipulate to them. The unreasonable refusal, to stipulate 
should be severely sanctioned. Where matters are not indisputable 
but the evidence leans strongly in one direction parties might be en-
couraged to trade stipulations. One party would refrain from con-
testing a matter on which he would probably not prevail in exchange 
for the other party's restraint in similar circumstances. A judge who 
has closely supervised pretrial proceedings is in a good position to 
suggest appropriate trades. 
B. Restructuring Juries 
A second way to enhance the quality of fact-finding in complex 
cases is to restructure juries. Some changes in jury composition and 
decision rules, like some methods for reducing complexity, are desir-
able regardless of whether they are constitutionally necessary be-
cause they promise improvements in jury justice whatever the 
starting point. 
First, all federal district courts should return to twelve-member 
juries. A jury is in many ways as strong as its strongest link. Limit-
ing juries in complex cases to six members halves the resources that 
the jury can bring to bear on difficult problems.100 Larger juries may 
be especially valuable when substantial amounts of damages are in 
issue because their verdicts are less likely to be extreme than those of 
smaller juries.101 Those who argue that the jury cannot deal ration-
ally with the issues in complex cases should certainly be required to 
show that their arguments hold true for twelve-member juries. 
In addition to their superior ability to cope with complexity, 
twelve-member juries protect against one of the hazards of complex 
100. For reviews of the relevant literature, see M. SAKS & R. HAsnE, SocIAL PSYCHOL-
OGY IN COURT, 72-88 (1978); Lempert, supra note 10, at 684-89. See also Ballew v. Georgia, 
435 U.S. 223, 231-44 (1978) (citing articles). 
101. See Zeisel, .. • And Tlten Tltere Were None: Tlte Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 
U. Cm. L. REv. 710, 716-19 (1971). 
116 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 80:68 
cases - the possibility that an unexpectedly large number of jurors 
will be unable to hear the entire case. If a jury starts with six mem-
bers and the maximum of six alternates that are allowed in federal 
civil trials, 102 either party could force a mistrial if seven had to with-
draw over the course of the proceedings. If the trial had begun with 
twelve jurors and six alternates, the parties could be required to ac-
cept the judgment of the eleven who remained at the end since there 
is now no constitutional right to a civil jury larger than six. 
Six-member juries, however, do have one advantage over twelve-
member juries in trying complex civil suits: they are less likely to 
hang. 103 Hung juries .are always costly to the litigants and the court 
system, but they are especially so if a retrial will take half a year. 
The differential hanging propensity of six- and twelve-member juries 
in civil cases is not serious enough to outweigh the benefits of the 
larger number, 104 but special efforts to avoid hung juries are justified 
in complex cases because of the immense costs. One possible ap-
proach is to construct a civil equivalent of the Allen or "dynamite" 
charge.105 Coupling an Allen-type instruction with an invitation to 
compromise on damages should be particularly effective in ending 
stalemates on the liability issue. 
Another approach is to allow federal civil juries to return verdicts 
although two or three members remain unconvinced. The constitu-
tional status of such a reform is unclear because Justice Powell, who 
provided the swing vote in the cases that upheld the constitutionality 
of nonunanimous verdicts in state criminal trials, 106 rested his deci-
sion on the belief that the fourteenth amendment does not impose 
the precise mandate of the sixth amendment on the states. The sixth 
amendment, in Justice Powell's view, allows defendants charged 
with federal crimes to insist on unanimous verdicts. 
If a purely historical test is used, the seventh amendment must be 
read like the sixth. There are, however, good policy reasons for not 
102. FED. R. CIV. P. 47(b). 
103. See Lempert, supra note 10, at 649; Zeise!, supra note IOI, at 720-21. In ILC Per-
ipherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 441 (N.D. 
Cal. 1978), a jury did hang following a trial of five months. The trial judge indicated that in 
the event of a retrial he would strike the jury demand. 458 F. Supp. at 444-49. 
104. In criminal cases twelve-member juries apparently hang about five percent of the time 
and six-member juries about half that amount. See Zeise!, supra note IOI, at 720. Hungjury 
rates are apparently lower in civil cases because of the different kinds of issues involved and 
the possibility of compromising on damage amounts. 
105. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896). TheAl/en charge encouraged 
deadlocked juries to return verdicts. 
106. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 
359-61 (1972). 
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reading the amendments similarly, and there is precedent for differ-
ent readings in that Colegrove v. Battin 107 allows seventh amendment 
juries to have as few as six members while the sixth amendment, 
under Powell's analysis, requires twelve jurors where a crime is 
charged.108 
From a policy standpoint the crucial difference between civil and 
criminal cases lies in the burdens of proof. The plaintiff in a civil 
case must prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence, while 
the prosecutor in a criminal trial is constitutionally required to prove 
his case "beyond a reasonable doubt." 109 Although it is not, strictly 
speaking, illogical to decide by a vote ofl0-2 or even 7-5 that a mat-
ter is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, there is something disquiet-
ing about the judgment. Not only does it imply that the doubts of 
the dissenters are not reasonable, but it also ~liminates the system's 
major guarantee that the reasonable doubt standard has been met -
that twelve people are willing to agree on a verdict. In a civil case, 
the situation is different. If a plaintiff has proved his case by only a 
slight preponderance of the evidence, some disagreement among the 
jurors is to be expected. Certainly the attainment of the requisite 
burden is not somehow rendered suspect by the fact that not all ju-
rors agree with the majority's assessment. Nonunanimous verdicts 
in civil cases, therefore, differ from those in criminal cases in that 
they do not threaten the core values that the jury system was 
designed to protect. 
There is, however, a further problem with allowing 
nonunanimous verdicts. They affect both the quality of jury deliber-
ations and the way that dissenters are treated. 11° For this reason 
nonunanimous verdicts should not be received, even in civil cases, 
until the jury has deliberated for a substantial length of time, re-
ported itself deadlocked on more than one occasion, and failed to 
respond to a civil version of the Allen charge. If these procedures are 
followed and if twelve-member juries are required, nonunanimous 
verdicts have a place not only in complex litigation but in civil cases 
generally. 
A second approach to restructuring juries recognizes that the 
qualities of those who serve as jurors affect the quality of jury deci-
107. 413 U.S. 149 (1973). 
108. The issue of whether the Constitution allows criminal juries in federal cases to consist 
of fewer than 12 jurors has not yet arisen. Justice Powell was not on the Court when Williams 
v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), was decided. 
109. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
110. See M. SAKS, supra note 75, at 20-24. 
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sion-making, and so emphasizes juror selection. The time demands 
of complex cases mean that employed workers tend disproportion-
ately to be missing from the juries that hear them. 111 This is unfortu-
nate because the employed include people with special knowledge 
regarding the issues that the jury must resolve as well as higher sta-
tus, better educated individuals who, when they sit on juries, tend to 
make particularly valuable contributions.112 
The most important step in inducing more able people to serve 
on juries is, no doubt, to increase the amenities associated with jury 
duty. Paid parking, a pleasant juror lounge, or a lifetime exemption 
from further jury duty might all increase people's willingness to 
serve for extended periods of time. But the most important "amen-
, ity" is almost certainly the fee that jurors are paid. Many workers 
cannot afford extended jury duty unless their employment contract 
provides for salary continuation, and fees must be quite substantial 
to compensate individuals who hold well-paying jobs. One way to 
raise fees is to match - within certain limits -jurors' pre-existing 
salaries, but the resulting differences in compensation could under-
mine jury morale. Another approach is to pay the usual jury fees for 
the short period of jury service that can reasonably be demanded of 
any citizen, but to raise compensation dramatically after that. If, for 
example, jury fees were raised to $200 a day after the first week of 
trial, only a small fraction of the population would suffer such a sub-
stantial loss that it would be unreasonable to require them to serve. 
Less drastic fee increases would be necessary if the state and federal 
governments exempted jury fees from taxes. This would allow equal 
payments while making juror compensation more valuable to .those 
in higher income brackets. 
Fees high enough to encourage, or at least not penalize, jury duty 
by better educated, employed individuals would be costly. With jury 
fees of $200 a day, a twelve-person jury with three alternates would 
cost $15,000 a week in fees alone. But costs of this magnitude are not 
prohibitive in large-scale ·complex cases, where the amount at stake 
can be half a billion dollars or more and lawyers' fees can run into 
the millions of dollars. Jury fees are currently limited by statute, but 
given the discretion that courts have to charge other extraordinary 
111. See Comment, The Right to an Incompetent Jury: Protracted Commercial Litigallon 
and the Seventh Amendment, 10 CONN. L. REV. 775, 776-83 (1978). 
112. See A. ELWORK, B. SALES & J. Al.FINI, MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTAND• 
ABLE (in press) [hereinafter cited as A. ELWORK et al J; R. HAsTIE et al, supra note 75; James, 
Status and Competence of Jurors, 64 AM. J. Soc. 563 (1959); Strodtbeck, James & Hawkins, 
Social Status in Jury .Deliberations, 22 AM. Soc. REv. 713 (1957) [hereinafter cited as 
Strodtbeck et al]. 
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expenses to the parties, a limited grant of discretion to raise jury fees 
in lengthy cases would not be a startling innovation. 113 
Paying substantial jury fees might have virtues beyond its recruit-
ment potential. First, if jurors were generously paid, they could be 
expected to treat jury duty as a full-time job. They might, for exam-
ple, be asked to spend otherwise free time studying exhibits in the 
case or reading transcripts of prior testimony. Second, if juror fees 
were chargeable to the parties as nontaxable costs, each party would 
have an added incentive to pare his case within the limits of effective 
presentation.114 
It is possible to do more than merely make it feasible for better 
educated, employed people to be represented on juries in something 
like their population proportion. One might require "blue ribbon" 
juries in complex cases on the theory that jurors who meet minimum 
standards of education or experience are more likely than others to 
understand the evidence.115 Unlike the above reforms, which are de-
sirable even if the jury currently has sufficient competence to satisfy 
the fifth amendment's due process standards, the blue ribbon jury 
should be treated as a "last resort." We should move in this direc-
tion only if ordinary juries cannot rationally deal with complexity 
because those traits of education and status that distinguish blue rib-
113. Under FED. R. Ctv. P. 54(a), trial courts have considerable discretion in d~ding 
what fees and costs to charge to the parties. Special costs attributable to the complexity of 
cases, such as the costs of daily transcripts and the compensation of Masters appointed by the 
court under FED. R. Ctv. P. 53, are taxable to the losing party. District courts may also pro-
ceed by local rule to specify that certain items will or will not be routinely taxed as costs. See 
generally IO C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 54, at§§ 2665-2679. Jury fees, however, are 
now limited to $20 a day for the first 30 days of attendance at the place of trial or hearing and, 
at the discretion of the trial judge, to $25 a day after 30 days devoted to one case. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1871(b)(1)·(2) (Supp. m 1979). 
114. Even with generous fee schedules and other valued amenities, there may be di.fficiµ-
ties in securing anything like the proportionate representation of the most promising jurors. 
Fees comparable to or in excess of ordinary earnings may still not compensate jurors for the 
career opportunities that are lost by a lengthy period of jury duty. In particular, an employer 
may feel an employee is disloyal ifhe does not seek to avoid a responsibility that will take him 
away from his job for several months. However, careers usually survive lengthy illnesses. If 
losing time to extended periods of jury duty came to be perceived of as being as involuntary as 
losing time to illness, lengthy jury service would not imply disinterest in career so the opportu-
nity costs of such service might not seem as great as they do now. 
The benefits of inducing better qualified people to serve on juries may be undermined if 
one or both lawyers use peremptory challenges to eliminate those who appear the most compe-
tent This is a difficult problem to deal with since indications of competence, such as higher 
education, may also be indicators of class bias - an appropriate ground for the exercise of 
peremptories. If a lawyer appears to be targeting his peremptories at jurors who appear unbi-
ased but competent and if the lawyer is unable to provide another plausible explanation for his 
behavior, it may be appropriate for the judge to replace the challenged juror with others in the 
venire who have similar indicators of likely competence rather than with those who emerge at 
random. However, this is a drastic step given important traditions and the association of bi-
ases with indicators of status. I am not sure that it is wise. 
115. Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 3, at 899-900 & n.63. 
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bon jurors tend to be associated with particular socioeconomic 
views. 116 Moreover, blue ribbon jurors may be more likely than ju-
rors of lesser prestige and attainment to have biases that will be acti-
vated by the issues in complex cases and interfere with rational 
judgment. And although it appears that better educated, higher sta-
tus jurors are more likely than those of lesser accomplishment to 
make valued contributions to jury decision-making, 117 it does not 
follow that a jury composed entirely of blue ribbon jurors will per-
form better than a jury that is socially less homogeneous. As Hastie 
and his colleagues point out, jurors who participate relatively little in 
the jury's deliberations may, nevertheless, make valuable contribu-
tions when they do speak because they have a perspective that others 
do not share. 118 Incremental contributions to group decision-making 
do not necessarily reflect individual competence. People with 
unique perspectives can contribute more to a group than more com-
petent individuals who duplicate the strengths of other members. 
This suggests that fully blue ribbon juries need never be seated. 
Even if blue ribbon jurors are superior decision-makers, a jury may 
reach a sounder decision if only a portion of its members are selected 
for their blue ribbon credentials. Shadow juries and simulations al-
low this possibility to be tested. 
Should courts start seating blue ribbon jurors in complex litiga-
tion, evaluation of the reform would be important. An expensive but 
promising technique is to sit in each such case a shadow jury repre-
sentative of those ordinarily called to jury duty. In addition to com-
paring the verdicts of the shadow and blue ribbon juries, we could (if 
the actual jurors consented to be interviewed) also learn how well 
each jury understood the case and how each dealt with the complex 
issues that arose. If shadow blue ribbon jurors could also be re-
cruited "responsibility bias" might also be controlled.119 Public 
opinion polling also has a place in evaluating the blue ribbon inno-
vation. Before mandating blue ribbon juries, courts should know 
how the preconceptions and values of people likely to qualify for 
116. Public opinion polls, for example, consistently show strong relationships between 
political preferences and factors, such as education or employment status, that would differen-
tiate blue ribbon from ordinary juries. See, e.g., G. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL,pass/m 
(1972). 
ll7. A. ELWORK et al, supra note ll2; R. HAsne era/, supra note 75; Strodtbeck et al, 
supra note 112. 
118. See R. HAsTIE et al, supra note 75; James, supra note 112. 
119. One could also deal with the "responsibility bias" problem by sitting shadow blue 
ribbon juries in cases heard by ordinary juries. If.the shadow blue ribbon jury showed better 
understanding of the law and facts than the actual jury the difference could not be attributed to 
the greater attention that might accompany responsibility for the verdict. 
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blue ribbon service differ from those of other adults. The less the 
di.ff erence between the performance of paired shadow and blue rib-
bon juries and the greater the value differences between blue ribbon 
jurors and other citizens, the weaker the case for this reform. 
C. Case Management Techniques 
Changes in the way that cases are handled is a third way to help 
juries cope with extreme complexity. Again, many of these reforms 
are desirable even if the difficulties that juries have with complex 
cases do not deny due process, and some may enhance the quality of 
jury justice even when cases are not complex. 
Jury instructions constitute one area where there is room for sub-
stantial improvement. The linguistic difficulties of common instruc-
tions have been documented and methods for increasing their 
comprehensibility have been developed.120 Judges in complex cases 
should carefully consider the instructions that they give, for the is-
sues in such cases are difficult enough to understand when instruc-
tions are well drafted. Although instructions may be tailored to the 
specific facts of cases, many instructions, even those that are to some 
extent tailored, follow a standard format. Simulation techniques al-
low researchers to evaluate the comprehensibility of standard in-
structions and to test reformulations designed to convey the same 
meaning in simpler language. 
Now that we know about the linguistic problems that make jury 
instructions incomprehensible and know ways to avoid these 
problems, the redrafting of jury instructions should proceed apace. 
Regardless of complexity, juries are more likely to reach verdicts 
faithful to the law if they understand their instructions. In complex 
cases, clear instructions are particularly important because a princi-
pal argument against using juries in such cases is that jurors are un-
able to understand the legal tests that they must apply. Research 
designed to make instructions more comprehensible could determine 
whether ( or the degree to which) this accusation is true, and, if so, 
whether the problem can be remedied. 
It may also be desirable to instruct juries on the law. before any 
120. See A. ELWORK et al., supra note 112; Charrow & Charrow, Making Legal .Language 
Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of' JIii')' Instructions, 19 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 1306 (1979); 
Elwork, Sales & Alfini, Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of'the Law or in Light of' It?, 1 LAW & 
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 163 (1977); Sales, Elwork & Alfini, Improving Comprehension for Jury In-
structions, in 1 PERsPECI'IVES IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY (THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM) (B. 
Sales ed. 1977). 
122 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 80:68 
evidence is presented.121 This technique can alert jurors to issues 
that are likely to be crucial, and may help them concentrate their 
attention on the most important evidence. It is possible, however, 
that early instructions may lead juries to judge the case prematurely 
or to ignore evidence that when presented is not obviously relevant 
to the legal issues highlighted by the instructions. The costs and ben-
efits of early instructions can be tested by a standard simulation tech-
nique. Mock jurors can view taped trials that vary only in the time 
at which instructions are given. If they report less confusion and 
their deliberations suggest that evidence is considered more ration-
ally when instructions are given at the outset, there is good reason to 
adopt this technique. Trials used for simulations would, of course, 
be quite different than the trials of complex cases, but there is little 
reason to expect the experimental effects to reverse themselves with 
complexity. If prior instructions seem to enhance the quality of jury 
decision-making, judges in complex cases may wish to instruct juries 
on important legal matters as the cases progress - first before the 
issue is raised by the plaintiff, again when the defendant responds, 
and finally before deliberations begin. 
Another major problem in complex cases is memory. These 
cases can be so long that the unaided memory is certain to forget 
much that has transpired. In addition, some of what is recalled will 
be affected by the natural distortions that occur when information 
must be retained for 'long periods of time.122 
Memory aids increase the likelihood that material will be accu-
rately recalled. The memory aid that is most commonly suggested is 
juror note-taking, but I doubt that this is a good idea. The principal 
danger is not, as is usually argued, that the juror who takes the best 
notes will dominate discussion. Rather it is that most people do not 
know how to take notes. While noting one point, jurors may not 
hear ongoing testimony, or they may record the trivial and neglect 
more probative information. Moreover, the summarizing that is 
usually part of note-taking may itself distort what is said. Fortu-
nately, a better memory aid is available. Daily transcripts are rou-
tinely produced during complex litigation. Jurors could study these 
transcripts during recesses or while at home and note what they 
thought most important. At the close of the trial, the jury might be 
given an indexed transcript and a list of exhibits to allow quick refer-
ence to matters deemed central. 
121. A. ELWORK et al, supra note 112, at_; Prettyman, Jury Instructions-Firs/ or Last?, 
46 A.B.A. J. 1066 (1960). 
122. See, e.g., G. LoFTUS & E. LOFTUS, HUMAN MEMORY 113-15 (1976). 
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- Another way to deal with memory problems is to break cases into 
smaller chunks. I have already discussed the possibility of seeking 
verdicts on separate issues as trials progress, and I have suggested 
that this approach would so severely change the jury system that it 
should be used, if at all, only as a last resort. 123 A related, but less 
drastic innovation, is to allow jurors to assess the evidence by delib-
erating periodically during the trial. These assessments should be 
tentative, and no separate verdicts should be received, for the danger 
in this approach is that the jury will on the basis of relatively little 
evidence develop a theory that resists change when counter evidence 
is received.124 Periodic deliberations are most promising where is-
sues are clearly severable. If cases could be restructured so that the 
defendant's evidence on_ each issue followed the plaintiff's, the jury 
could evaluate issues with the evidence clearly in mind. Since ver-
dicts would not be returned, the jurors would not have to reach a 
consensus in these interim discussions. If tentative judgments were 
inconsistent with what later appeared correct, the jurors could focus 
specifically on the inconsistency and decide whether the later or ear-
lier judgment was better informed. The utility of this technique 
might be tested by the use of shadow juries or by simulations that 
extend over several days. 
Another major threat to rational fact-finding in complex cases is 
the possibility that crucial evidence will be too technical for lay un-
derstanding. Techniques that aid the jury in understanding abstruse 
testimony and technical documents will lead to better informed 
decisions. 
Perhaps the simplest technique to aid understanding, and one al-
ready practiced by a number of courts, is to allow jurors to question 
witnesses. This can be helpful not only where testimony is technical, 
but also where jurors think that a crucial issue in the case has not 
been elucidated by a witness likely to have relevant information. 
The method for allowing questions is simple. After the parties have 
finished examining a witness, the jurors write out their questions and 
give them to the judge. The judge screens the questions to eliminate 
those that seek inadmissible evidence or are otherwise inappropriate, 
and puts the remaining questions to the witness. Alerted by the 
jury's concerns, the judge may also follow up with his own questions. 
123. See text following note 94 supra. 
124. For a discussion of a number of ways in which strong initial theories can lead to 
irrational decision-making, see R. NISBETT & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE (1980). It appears 
that the trial is well designed to inhibit undue reliance on early theories. See J. THIBAUT & L. 
WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1975); Weld & Roff, A Study in the Formation of Opinion 
Based Upon Legal Evidence, 51 AM. J. PSYCH. 609 (1938). 
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Allowing questions in complex cases does more than allow jurors 
to seek additional information or to probe areas of confusion. The 
procedure may help maintain juror interest in lengthy proceedings, 
and may also be a good way to monitor how well the jurors under-
stand the case. If juror questions show good understanding of the 
evidence and issues, a judge should be restrained in summarizing or 
commenting on the evidence and should be particularly reluctant to 
take the case from the jury by a directed verdict or a judgment n.o. v. 
If the questions suggest confusion, the judge may want to use jury 
control devices more aggressively. Finally, if counsel were shown 
the unasked questions, they would know what matters were troub-
ling the jurors and might be able to develop admissible evidence that 
would clarify points of confusion. 
Like many of the potential reforms that I have alluded to, it is 
not clear how well this would work in practice. Jurors may, for ex-
ample, give disproportionate weight to the evidence that responds to 
their questions because they feel a stake in this evidence that they do 
not feel in evidence that the lawyers develop independently. And 
lawyers may mistakenly change aspects of their cases to reduce only 
one juror's confusion. Finally, juror questions may take more time 
than they are worth. Lawyers may typically be good judges of which 
issues are crucial and may present enough information so that most 
jurors can infer appropriate answers to the questions that other ju-
rors want specifically addressed. Again our assessment of reform re-
quires empirical information that we do not now possess. 
Simulation studies, interviews with jurors who have or have not been 
allowed to ask questions, and analysis of the questions that jurors in 
fact ask can all aid in evaluating the desirability of this innovation. 
Perhaps the most confusing aspect of any case that turns in part 
on technical issues is the conflict that often exists between the testi-
mony of experts. Most such testimony purports to be scientific, and 
the lay view of the sciences is that they yield one right answer to 
difficult questions. If scientists with impressive credentials cannot 
agree on the implications of the dominant theories in their field, how 
can a lay jury be expected to reach such a decision? 
The most commonly suggested solution to the battle of experts 
problem is that the court appoint its own "champion" to testify as a 
"neutral." This reform is undoubtedly oversold. It shares the lay 
assumption that the scientific implications of evidence are likely to 
be unequivocal, and implies that the primary reason that parties' 
witnesses disagree is that they are paid to espouse different positions. 
In fact, there are often competing theories within scientific disci-
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plines, particularly within such forensically relevant sciences as psy-
chology and economics. Even where a theoretical perspective is 
generally accepted, competent scientists may differ on the implica-
tions of particular facts. It is probably more common for experts to 
be paid because of the positions that they espouse than for experts to 
espouse positions because they are paid. 
A judicially appointed expert may be neutral in the sense that he 
owes his salary to neither party, but he may have a strong allegiance 
to a particular theoretical perspective or ,to a way of reading equivo-
cal evidence.125 If the expert's testimony is largely conclusory, it is 
unclear how that testimony will affect the rationality of the jury's 
decision. Some will argue that the jury's best strategy is to accept the 
appointed expert's judgment. Yet because the subject matter is tech-
nical and a court-appointed expert's professional biases may be as 
strong and as controversial as those of the parties' experts, a jury can 
never be sure when it is rational to defer to apparent neutrality. 
I also doubt the value of testimony that reexamines the conclu-
sions of partisan experts and offers an independent judgment of the 
evidence. If the subject matter is difficult, it becomes likely that the 
"neutral" expert will interfere with the jury's attempt to evaluate the 
evidence. The jury is likely to be most tempted to cut short its effort 
to understand and to uncritically substitute an expert's judgment 
when comprehension is most difficult. This process yields rational 
results only when the judgment of the court's expert is right. When 
the expert's testimony goes to the core of the case and deference to 
the court's expert is complete, the right to jury trial has, in effect, 
been suppressed. 
There is, however, another role that court-appointed experts can 
play. They can be used as resource persons for the jury rather than 
as sources of additional opinions. As such they could outline the· 
theoretical conflicts within their discipline, and tell the jury where 
the parties' experts fit on the theoretical spectrum. The court-ap-
pointed experts could also comment on the credentials of the parties' 
experts, explaining, for example, the meaning of particular honorific 
positions or the difference between publishing in refereed or 
nonrefereed journals. Most importantly they could explain technical 
language and tell the jurors why, given a particular theoretical per-
spective, certain facts would be especially relevant. Although court-
appointed experts would undoubtedly be influenced by their profes-
125. See Diamond, Tlze Fallacy of the Impartial Expert, 3 ARCHIVES OF CRIM. PSYCHODY-
NAMICS 221 (1959). 
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sional biases, even in their capacity as educators of the jury, profes-
sionals are often able to explain fairly positions with which they do 
not agree. And much of what the court's expert would tell the jury 
would be uncontroversial regardless of theoretical perspectives. Ide-
ally, the parties' experts would agree on the neutral expert, thus pro-
viding a further expectation of fairness. 
Court-appointed experts might also play a role after the case has 
gone to the jury. If during deliberations the jury was confused or 
unable to agree about a particular technical matter, jurors might be 
allowed to question the neutral expert in open court about the source 
of their confusion or disagreement. The parties might be permitted 
to examine the expert further or to present their own experts' views 
as well. If this questioning were confined to probing the meaning of 
technical testimony, it would help the jurors evaluate complex evi-
dence without encouraging them to substitute an expert's judgment 
for their own. 
D. "Backstopping" the Jury 
Where the evidence in a civil case is so clear that only one verdict 
is reasonable, a judge can take a case from the jury by issuing a 
directed verdict or reverse a jury's unreasoned verdict by entering a 
judgment n.o.v. Where the evidence is less one-sided, a judge can 
guide a jury toward what he sees as the correct decision by summa-
rizing and commenting on the evidence and through more subtle 
cues that may be conveyed while presiding. 126 If the jury does not 
respond suitably, a judge can order a new trial when he feels that an 
injustice has been done. 
Thus, if the judge understands the issues in a complex case and 
follows the evidence, judgments should never be so unreasonable 
that they could not be rationally supported by a fair reading of the 
evidence. This does not mean that all sustainable verdicts will in 
fact reflect good understanding of the law and evidence, but it en-
sures against egregious failures of rational decision-making. If there 
is some danger that juries will be unable to evaluate the evidence in 
complex cases rationally, judges might be encouraged to make 
greater use of the jury control devices available to them. The most 
promising of these devices is the right to enter judgment n.o. v. be-
cause it somewhat paradoxically intrudes least on the right to jury 
trial. Although it turns the jury's judgment on its head, it does so 
126. See Note, Judge's Nonverbal Behavior in Jury Trials: A Threat lo Judicial Impartiality, 
61 VA. L. R.Ev. 1266 (1975). 
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openly and thus allows for meaningful review of the core issue -
was the jury's judgment irrational - on appeal. 
It is almost impossible to truly summarize the evidence in com-
plex cases. A useful summary would be so highly condensed that it 
would necessarily reflect the judge's assessment of what was most 
important, and so resemble a commentary. Whether such an im-
plicit commentary or the more explicit comments allowed by federal 
law enhance the rationality of jury decision-making depends in part 
on the relative abilities of judges and jurors - an unanswered em-
pirical question. Until we are confident that judges deal more ra-
tionally with the problems posed by complex cases than do jurors, 
judges should not increase their use of summary and comment, and 
jurors should not be encouraged to substitute judicial judgments, as 
conveyed in commentary, for their own decisions. 
There is, however, another use that can be made of summary and 
comment. Instead of suggesting a view of the evidence, the judge 
could indicate which disputed matters he considers crucial. In this 
way, he could highlight conflicts in the evidence without suggesting 
how the conflict should be resolved. If done skillfully, the jury 
would have a good sense of the matters most deserving of its atten-
tion. If done poorly, the jury might misdirect its energies and miss 
crucial issues, but at least no verdict would have been suggested to it. 
The utility of this type of commentary would be enhanced if it were 
given before the lawyers made their conclucijng remarks, for then the 
lawyers could emphasize the evidence and muster the arguments 
that bore most directly on matters that the judge thought crucial. 
The lawyers could also serve as critics of the judge, suggesting why 
the judge's perspective was not necessarily correct and adding to the 
agenda items that the judge had missed. 
Directed verdicts at the close of all the evidence ~hould be 
avoided in complex cases because they deny jurors the satisfaction 
that comes from helping to resolve a matter that has occupied their 
attention for many months. Furthermore, if the matter should not 
have been taken from the jury, a lengthy retrial will be necessary 
although had the jury beeri allowed to deliberate, it would have 
probably returned the verdict that the judge directed. 127 The judge 
might, however, commit himself to a position before the jury con-
cludes its deliberations. If the judge q.ecides which of the possible 
127. In K.ALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 37, the authors report that judges agree with juries 
about three quarters of the time. Where they disagree, cases are usually considered close. 
When directed verdicts are appropriate, cases should not appear close, so the expected rate of 
judge-jury agreement would be high. 
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verdicts is reasonable while the jury is out, his evaluation will not be 
influenced by his knowledge of the jury's decision. Although the 
judge may wish to reconsider his position if the jury's judgment dif-
fers from his, in considering the inevitable motion for judgment 
n. o. v. the judge should confront the fact that at the close of the case 
he regarded the verdict that the jury later returned as untenable. 
The standard for enteringjudgmentn.o.v. is the same as that for 
a directed verdict. It is appropriate "only where there is no substan-
tial evidence to support recovery by the party against whom it is di-
rected or where the evidence is all against him or so overwhelmingly 
so as to leave no room to doubt what the fact is."128 The standard is 
strict, but despite the language of some courts, it inevitably leaves 
leeway for discretion. 129 If a judge believes that the jury has erred 
because it has been confused by the complexity of the case, he 
should resolve all doubts as to the limits of his authority in favor of 
ordering the judgment n.o. v. But in so doing, the judge should state 
in detail why he feels that the evidence allows only one result. This 
will allow the appellate court to evaluate the crucial issues and to 
reinstate the jury verdict if it disagrees with the judge's perceptions. 
The appellate court is likely to be well-equipped to do this because 
judgments n.o. v. are most likely to be appropriate in complex cases 
where the position of one party's experts on the implication of the 
evidence is, as a scientific matter, untenable. This kind of judgment, 
when presented in the context of a clash between experts, is probably 
the most difficult for a lay jury to make. Both the trial judge and the 
appellate court have an advantage over the jury in this respect be-
cause they can take judicial notice of the wide range of published 
materials that bear on the scientific issues. 
The judge may also control the jury by ordering a new trial. 
New trials are available where the trial judge believes that a jury 
verdict should not stand either because he is convinced that the ver-
128. Garrison v. United States, 62 F.2d 41, 42 (4th Cir. 1932). To approach the matter 
from the other side, the motion for judgment n.o.v. should be denied "if there is substantial 
evidence opposed to the motions, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable 
and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions." 
Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir. 1969) (en bane). See Cooper, Directions 
for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55 MINN. L. REv. 903 (1971), 
129. It might be thought that the occasion for directed verdicts and judgments n.o. v. would 
be rare in cases with masses of evidence, all of which must be interpreted so as to favor the 
party resisting the motion. However, the implications of massive evidence often depend en-
tirely on how the evidence fits some scientific theory. If the theory offered by one of the parties 
is untenable, a directed verdict will be appropriate, however massive the other evidence. The 
question of whether a party's theory is, in the light of the evidence, so untenable as not to 
present a jury question is one the trial court can address in the opinion accompanying its grant 
of judgment n.o. v. 
November 1981] Juries.in Complex Cases 129 
diet is mistaken or because he recognizes an error in the trial process 
that might have distorted the jury's judgment. Since new trials may 
be ordered despite evidence that supports the jury's verdict, the order 
for a new trial might appear to be an effective means for avoiding 
injustice when there are doubts about the rationality of the jury's 
judgment. But complex trials are exceedingly costly to both the par-
ties and the judicial system, and if a first jury has been confused by 
the complexity of the litigation there is little reason to believe that 
the second jury will not be similarly confused. Thus, judges should 
be receptive to motions for judgment n.o. v. when there is a close 
question whether a jury verdict is tenable and it appears that the 
verdict resulted from confusion. But when a jury verdict is not so 
untenable as to justify judgment n.o. v., judges should be reluctant to 
grant new trials even if they believe the result unfair and attribute 
the verdict to confusion. The judgment n.o. v. is easily reviewable 
and likely to end the matter. The granting of a new trial, however, 
will continue what has already been a protracted proceeding - per-
haps for years. 130 The problem is compounded because uncondi-
tional orders granting new trials are not considered final judgments 
and so cannot ordinarily be appealed before completion of the new 
trial. 131 The cost of relitigating the case can be enormous, and the 
denouement may be an appellate opinion reinstating the original 
verdict. 
This is.likely to be the case even with the partial new trial permit-
ted under rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure since one 
of the features of complex lengthy trials is the way that evidence and 
issues are inextricably linked. If this linkage does not exist, as where 
a damage issue is easily severable from a liability issue, the partial 
new trial may be a viable way of securing a jury judgment that does 
not require further · lengthy proceedings and is not tainted by 
confusion. 
The case for slightly greater use of the judgment n.o. v. as a jury 
control device may trouble some readers because it appears to as-
sume an answer to the empirical question of whether judges are 
130. Even though stakes in complex cases are often huge, the fact of decision may be as 
important as the decision ultimately reached. Capital markets, for example, may be substan-
tially distorted by the threat of a large liability judgment against a firm. Once the judgment 
has been entered, the market may be better able to react. 
131. For a discussion of the basic ''no final judgment" rule and the problems with reliance 
on appeal by certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or resort to extraordinary writs, see 15 C. 
WRIGHT, A. Mll.LER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE,§ 3915, at 593-98 
(1976 & Supp. 1981) (final judgment rule); 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 3930, at 163-65 (1977 & Supp. 1981) (§ 1292(b)); Id at§ 3935, at 
256-57 (extraordinary writ). 
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more able fact-finders than juries in complex litigation. But the case 
does not depend on an affirmative answer to this question. Regard-
less of which decision-maker is the better fact-finder on the average 
or which may be expected to do a better job in a given case, the 
actual performance of judges and juries over a series of cases is likely 
to range from biased incompetence at one extreme to dazzling in-
sight at the other. Whe,n trial is to a jury and the jury's performance 
is, for whatever reason, incompetent, the judge, even if he is only 
performing at an average level, may "backstop" the jury and prevent 
egregious error from infecting the verdict. When a judge trying a 
case alone performs incompetently no "shadow" trier of fact can step 
in and order correction. 132 The argument, therefore, by no means 
assumes the incompetence of juries - either absolutely or in relation 
to judges. Properly understood, it is another argument for jury trial. 
The inevitability of occasional extreme error in any system of human 
judgment makes redundancy- existing here in the form of a second 
trier of fact - a desirable characteristic. 
CONCLUSION 
With increasing frequency, the federal courts are being called 
upon to resolve a fundamental question in our constitutional scheme 
for resolving disputes: Should jury trial be required in cases so com-
plex that laypeople cannot .find facts rationally in accordance with 
the law? There are two basic ways to approach this question. The 
first is by reference to the seventh amendment. We can ask whether 
it is possible, given the history and jurisprudence of the seventh 
amendment, to .find an exception to the right to jury trial solely be-
cause cases are complex. It appears that this question must be an-
swered "no."133 Even if this question were answered in the 
affirmative, it would not follow that there is a right not to have a jury 
trial. 134 Yet this is the crucial issue because the availability of jury 
trial is in dispute only when one party wishes it and the other does 
not. To .find a right to nonjury trial, one must look to another consti-
tutional source. The due process clause of the fifth amendment is the 
132. Indeed in bench trials, correction of trial court error may be least likely in the most 
egregious situation - where a judge is consciously biased for one party because of his views as 
to the desirability of the law in question. A judge with such a hidden agenda can disguise his 
motives through a careful presentation of factual findings. Given the mass of evidence in 
complex cases, it will be difficult if not impossible for appellate courts to review the reasona-
bleness of the trial judge's factual findings. 
133. See text at notes 12-31 supra. 
134. Thus a court may seat an advisory jury in an equity or admiralty case or the Congress 
could require trial by jury in such cases. See Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 
16, 20 (1963); Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1176, 1176-78 (1961). 
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obvious source, and to my mind the claimed priority of due process 
over the seventh amendment is ultimately compelling. If a jury is so 
unable to understand the issues and evidence that it cannot fairly 
decide a case and if bench trials would lead to fair decisions, I see no 
values, including the value of jury nullification, that argue persua-
sively for jury trial.13s 
However, to prefer the concerns of due process over the specific 
commands of the seventh amendment requires strong beliefs about 
the relative capacities of juries and judges to decide complex cases. 
First, one must believe that juries cannot rationally cope with the 
facts and law of complex cases. Second, one must believe that judges 
can react rationally to the problems such cases pose. Yet even these 
conditions are insufficient. If the defects that render the jury unfit to 
deal with complex cases are not inherent in the system of jury trial, 
courts must attempt to preserve the seventh amendment's command 
by changing the ways that juries are exposed to complex cases so that 
rational verdicts will emerge. Only if this cannot be done except at 
extreme cost 136 or by destroying the very values that the jury system 
is intended to preserve should a right to strike a jury demand 
emerge. 
We currently know little about the capacity of juries to evaluate 
rationally the evidence in complex cases or about the capacity of 
judges to do the same. Nor have we systematically explored reforms 
that might increase the quality of jury fact-finding. In short, the 
available empirical evidence does not justify strong beliefs about any 
of the matters that are crucial to a principled decision. . If the 
Supreme Court were to decide the constitutional issue today, the 
temptation to assume that complex cases cannot be rationally de-
cided by lay jurors might be overwhelming. The temptation to as-
sume that judges can deal rationally with such matters would be 
even greater because once the incapacity of the jury is assumed, the 
possible incapacity of judges becomes psychologically and legally 
intolerable. 
Although a conflict exists between the courts of appeals, the 
Supreme Court need not rush to judgment. It has two options. The 
Court can allow the circuits to go their separate ways, and then ob-
serve the outcomes of case~ brought under different systems.137 Or 
135. See text at notes 45-48 supra. 
136. "Extreme" is a relative term. Here it should involve rather high absolute costs since 
courts are called upon to allocate billions of dollars. 
137. The quasi-experiment that the conflict makes possible will be undermined to the ex-
tent that plaintiffs can choose the circuit in which they file suit. If there is usually a choice, the 
result of allowing the conflict to continue will be to concentrate complex cases in circuits recog-
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the Court can preserve the issue by holding that (1) given what we 
now know, doubts about the capacity of jurors to try complex cases 
must be resolved in favor of the specific command of the seventh 
amendment, and (2) should it someday be demonstrated that juries, 
but not judges, cannot respond rationally to complex cases, due process 
will mandate nonjury trials. Such a ruling should stimulate social 
scientists to study the problems of complex litigation, and one may 
hope that an outpouring of dollars by appropriate funding agencies 
would also follow. 
The empirical questions on which the constitutional analysis 
should turn may be substantially illuminated by various techniques 
of social science research. Although no single technique or type of 
study can provide more than a part of the information needed to 
reach crucial conclusions, enough different research should allow the 
Court, perhaps by the end of the decade, to reach the kind of in-
formed judgment that the matter merits. 138 We might, of course, 
learn that the fifth and seventh amendments do not clash. This is 
most likely if we recognize that the most important question in jury 
research today is not, "Do juries perform well or poorly?" It is, 
"How may the jury system be improved?" 
nizing the right to jury trial to the extent that plaintiffs are disproportionately more likely than 
defendants to want jury trials. 
138. This assumes that the research will be done. It is conceivable and perhaps likely that 
no concerted effort will be made to develop the information needed for an intelligent decision. 
In these circumstances the matter should be resolved by traditional legal analysis rather than 
by armchair speculation. As I have suggested, see text at notes 12-38 supra, both history and 
precedent support a seventh amendment right to jury trial in complex cases. Absent empirical 
research, the proponents of a fifth amendment based exception will not be able to carry their 
essentially empirical burden of proof. If government and private enterprise (including the 
proponents of a complexity exception) fail to appropriate the funds needed to illuminate the 
empirical issue, they will have spoken eloquently about the place which the potential conflict 
between the seventh and fifth amendments occupies on the national agenda. 
